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Abstract—Practical implementations of secret-key generation
are often based on sequential strategies, which handle reliability
and secrecy in two successive steps, called reconciliation and
privacy amplification. In this paper, we propose an alternative
approach based on polar codes that jointly deals with relia-
bility and secrecy. Specifically, we propose secret-key capacity-
achieving polar coding schemes for the following models: (i) the
degraded binary memoryless source (DBMS) model with rate-
unlimited public communication, (ii) the DBMS model with one-
way rate-limited public communication, (iii) the 1-to-m broadcast
model and (iv) the Markov tree model with uniform marginals.
For models (i) and (ii) our coding schemes remain valid for non-
degraded sources, although they may not achieve the secret-key
capacity. For models (i), (ii) and (iii), our schemes rely on pre-
shared secret seed of negligible rate; however, we provide special
cases of these models for which no seed is required. Finally, we
show an application of our results to secrecy and privacy for
biometric systems. We thus provide the first examples of low-
complexity secret-key capacity-achieving schemes that are able
to handle vector quantization for model (ii), or multiterminal
communication for models (iii) and (iv).
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike classical cryptography, physical-layer security relies
on information-theoretic metrics rather than complexity theory
and the supposed hardness of solving certain mathematical
problems. In particular, information-theoretic secret-key gen-
eration protocols [2], [3] put no limits on the computational
power of the adversary. In such protocols, legitimate users and
eavesdropper observe the realizations of correlated random
variables. The legitimate users, who can publicly communi-
cate, then aim at extracting a common secret-key from their
observations. The maximum number of secret-key bits per
observed realization of the random variables is called the
secret-key capacity [2], [3].
Bounds for the secret-key capacity have been derived for
a large variety of models [2]–[13]. Unfortunately, most rely
on typicality arguments and do not provide direct insight into
the design of practical secret-key capacity-achieving schemes.
There are, however, a few exceptions. For instance, there exist
constructive schemes for some multiterminal scenarios [14],
[15] based on explicit algorithms for tree packing. In addi-
tion, sequential methods can be constructed that successively
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handle reliability and secrecy by means of reconciliation and
privacy amplification. While sequential methods lead to low-
complexity schemes for unlimited public communication [16],
[17], their application to rate-limited public communica-
tion [10], [11] requires vector quantization for which, to the
best of our knowledge, no low-complexity schemes are known.
This paper presents low-complexity secret-key capacity-
achieving schemes based on polar codes [18] for some classes
of source models. Note that polar codes have already been
successfully used for secrecy in the context of symmetric
degraded wire-tap channel model [19]–[23], or more recently,
arbitrary broadcast channel with confidential messages [24],
[25], and for the Slepian-Wolf coding problem [26]–[29],
which is particularly relevant to secret-key generation. Note
also that in [30], the journal version of [28], a first application
of polar coding to a basic secret key generation setting
was proposed. Unlike sequential methods, which successively
handle reliability and secrecy, our schemes jointly deal with
reliability and secrecy (see Definition 2 for more details).
Both the sequential reliability-secrecy approach, and the direct
approach with polar codes have their advantages. On the one
hand, sequential methods offer flexibility in design by separat-
ing reliability and secrecy and, unlike polar coding schemes,
are known to remain optimal for two-way rate-limited com-
munication and continuous non-degraded sources [11]. On the
other hand, polar coding schemes may be easier to design
and operate at lesser complexity in some scenarios. They also
appear to be convenient to deal with vector quantization when
the public communication is rate-limited.
Our main contribution is to develop polar coding schemes
that achieve the secret-key capacity for the following models.
• The degraded binary memoryless source (DBMS) model
with rate-unlimited public communication;
• The DBMS model with one-way rate-limited public com-
munication;
• The 1-to-m broadcast model;
• The Markov tree model with uniform marginals.
For the first two models, the proposed polar coding schemes
may also be used to generate secret keys for non-degraded
sources, although they may not achieve the secret-key capacity.
For the first three models, we assume that the legitimate
users initialize their communication with a shared secret seed,1
whose length is negligible compared to the number of source
samples used to generate a key. As shown in Sections III-V,
there also exist special cases of the source statistics for which
no seed is required.
Note that [32], obtained independently from [1], develops
1If one assumes an authenticated public channel [2], [3] a shared small
secret seed in the order of the logarithm of the length of the messages is also
required for authentication [31].
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2an alternative polar coding solution for the BMS model with
rate-unlimited public communication. The major difference
between their approach and ours is that their construction is se-
quential, i.e., it successively deals with reliability and secrecy
by means of reconciliation and privacy amplification, whereas
our approach jointly deals with reliability and secrecy. The
construction in [32, Th. 7] has the advantage of not requiring
a seed. On the other hand, our protocol only requires one
“polarization layer,” whose construction is efficient, whereas
the sequential approach of [32] requires an inner and an outer
layer, the latter having no known efficient code construction
as discussed in [32, Section III.C].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II formally introduces some notation and the general
multi-terminal secret-key generation problem, which encom-
passes all the models specialized in subsequent sections.
Section III, describes a secret-key capacity-achieving scheme
with polar codes for the DBMS model with unlimited com-
munication rate. Section IV provides a secret-key capacity-
achieving scheme with polar codes for the DBMS model
with one-way rate-limited public communication. Section V
develops a secret-key capacity-achieving scheme with polar
codes for the 1-to-m broadcast model. Section VI studies
a Markov tree model with uniform marginals and provides
a secret-key capacity-achieving scheme with polar codes.
Finally, Section VII, shows how to apply the results to the
related problem of privacy and secrecy for key generation in
some biometric systems.
II. MULTITERMINAL SECRET-KEY GENERATION
We start by introducing some notation used throughout
the paper. We define the integer interval Ja, bK, as the set
of integers between bac and dbe. We denote the Bernoulli
distribution with parameter p ∈ [0, 1] by B(p). For n ∈ N and
N , 2n, we let GN ,
[
1 0
1 1
]⊗n
be the source polarization
transform defined in [26]. We note the components of a vector,
X1:N with superscripts, i.e., X1:N , (X1, X2, . . . , XN ).
Finally, we denote the variational distance and the divergence
between two distributions by V(·, ·) and D(·||·), respectively.
We now recall the general model for multiterminal secret-
key generation [5]. Let m > 2 be the number of terminals that
wish to generate a common secret-key. Set M , J1,mK, and
let Z and Xi, for i ∈ M be arbitrary finite alphabets. Define
XM as the Cartesian product of X1,X2, . . . ,Xm. Consider a
discrete memoryless multiple source (XMZ, pXMZ), where
XM , (X1, X2, . . . , Xm) and the Cartesian product XM×Z
is abbreviated as XMZ . For i ∈ M, Terminal i observes the
component Xi of (XMZ, pXMZ), whereas an eavesdropper
observes the component Z. The source is assumed to be
outside the control of all parties, but its statistics are known to
all parties. Communication is allowed between terminals over
an authenticated noiseless public channel with communication
rate Rp ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞}. A secret-key generation strategy is
then formally defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let Rp ∈ R+∪{+∞}. Let K be a key alphabet
of size 2NR. The protocol defined by the following steps
is called a (2NR, N,Rp) secret-key generation strategy with
public communication, and is denoted by SN .
1) Terminal i, i ∈M, observes X1:Ni .
2) The m terminals communicate, possibly interactively,
over the public channel. All the public inter-terminal
communications are collectively denoted by F and satisfy
H(F) 6 NRp.
3) Terminal i, i ∈M, computes Ki(X1:Ni ,F) ∈ K.
Let K be a random variable taking values in K. The
performance of a secret-key generation strategy SN that allows
the terminals inM to agree on the key K is measured in terms
of
• the average probability of error between the keys
Pe(SN ) , P[∃i ∈M : K 6= Ki],
• the information leakage to the eavesdropper L(SN ) ,
I(K;Z1:NF),
• the uniformity of the key U(SN ) , logd2NRe −H(K).
Definition 2. A secret-key rate R is achievable if there exists
a sequence of (2NR, N,Rp) secret-key generation strategies
{SN}N>1 such that
lim
N→∞
Pe(SN ) =0, (reliability)
lim
N→∞
L(SN ) =0, (strong secrecy)
lim
N→∞
U(SN ) =0. (uniformity)
Moreover, the supremum of achievable rates is called the
secret-key capacity and is denoted CWSK(Rp). In the special
case where Eve has no access to the component Z of the
source, the secret-key capacity is denoted CSK(Rp). One also
says that perfect secrecy is achieved if L(SN ) = 0.
In this paper, we develop low-complexity secret-key capacity-
achieving schemes based on polar codes for special cases of
the general model presented in Definition 1. In the following,
the blocklength, N , used by the legitimate users is a power of
2. Moreover, we say that the legitimate users share a secret
seed, if they share a secret sequence of dN ∈ N uniformly
distributed bits, and we define the seed rate as dN/N . To
avoid modifying the secret-key capacity with the introduction
of a seed, we only consider schemes with vanishing seed rate.
III. MODEL 1: SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH
RATE-UNLIMITED PUBLIC COMMUNICATION
The precise model and known results are described in
Section III-A. Our proposed polar coding scheme is given in
Section III-B and analyzed in Section III-C.
A. Secret-key generation model
As illustrated in Fig. 1, Model 1 consists of m = 2
legitimate terminals. We use X instead of X1 and Y instead
of X2 for convenience. We assume that X = {0, 1} and
that the public channel has an unlimited communication rate
Rp = +∞. We call this setup the BMS model with rate-
unlimited public communication. The following results are
known for this model.
3Theorem 1 ( [2], [3]). Consider a BMS (XYZ, pXY Z). If
X → Y → Z, then the secret-key capacity CWSK(+∞) is
CWSK(+∞) = I(X;Y )− I(X;Z).
Moreover, the secret-key capacity can be achieved by one-way
communication.
When the eavesdropper has no access to the source compo-
nent Z, one obtains the following expression for the secret-key
capacity.
Corollary 1 ( [2], [3]). Consider a BMS (XY, pXY ). The
secret-key capacity CSK(+∞) is
CSK(+∞) = I(X;Y ).
Moreover, the secret-key capacity can be achieved using only
one-way communication.
Such a model is motivated by the sources of randomness
that can be generated from wireless communication channel
gains [33], [34]. In such settings, the wireless channel gains
cA→B characterizing the channel from Alice to Bob, cB→A
characterizing the channel from Bob to Alice, and the pair
(cA→E , cB→E), characterizing the channels to Eve, may be
used as the variables X , Y , and Z, respectively, of Model 1.
B. Polar coding scheme
In the following, we assume that I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) > 0
but we do not assume that X → Y → Z forms a Markov
chain; we discuss at the end of the section how the coding
scheme simplifies when X → Y → Z holds.
Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. Set U1:N , X1:NGN . For any
set A , {ij}|A|j=1 of indices in J1, NK, we define U1:N [A] ,(
U i1 , U i2 , . . . , U i|A|
)
. For δN , 2−N
β
, where β ∈]0, 1/2[,
define the following sets
VX|Z ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1Z1:N) > 1− δN} ,
HX|Y ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1Y 1:N) > δN} .
The exact encoding and decoding algorithms are given in
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively, and we provide
here a high-level discussion of their operation. The set HX|Y
is the set of indices containing “high-entropy bits” such that
U1:N [HX|Y ] allows Bob to near losslessly reconstruct U1:N
from Y 1:N [26]. In our coding scheme, Alice therefore pub-
licly transmits U1:N [HX|Y ] to allow Bob to reconstruct U1:N .
By construction, the set VX|Z is the set of indices containing
!
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Fig. 1. Model 1: Secret-key generation for the BMS model with rate-
unlimited public communication
“very-high entropy bits” such that U1:N [VX|Z ] is almost
uniform and independent of the eavesdropper’s observations
Z1:N . Consequently, the secret-key should be chosen as a
subvector of U1:N [VX|Z ]; specifically, since U1:N [HX|Y ] is
publicly transmitted, it is natural to use U1:N [VX|Z\HX|Y ]
as the secret key. Unfortunately, HX|Y 6⊂ VX|Z in general, so
that the public communication of U1:N [HX|Y ] leaks some in-
formation about U1:N [VX|Z\HX|Y ]. To circumvent this issue,
our protocol uses a secret seed to protect the transmission of
the bits in positions HX|Y \VX|Z with a one-time-pad. In ad-
dition, our scheme operates over k blocks of size N to handle
non-degraded sources and to make the seed rate negligible. In
every Block i ∈ J1, kK Alice generates a secret key Ki together
with a seed K˜i used in the next block. Overall, Alice obtains
a vector of secret keys K1:k , [K1,K2, . . . ,Kk] while Bob
obtains a vector of estimates K̂1:k , [K̂1, K̂2, . . . , K̂k].
Algorithm 1 Alice’s encoding algorithm for Model 1
Require: K˜0, a secret key of size |HX|Y \VX|Z | shared by
Alice and Bob beforehand; for every Block i ∈ J1, kK, the
observations X1:Ni from the source; AXY Z a fixed subset
of VX|Z\HX|Y with size |HX|Y \VX|Z |.
1: for Block i = 1 to k do
2: U1:Ni ← X1:Ni GN
3: K˜i ← U1:Ni [AXY Z ]{Fraction of the key used as a seed
for the next block}
4: Ki ← U1:Ni [(VX|Z\HX|Y )\AXY Z ]
5: Fi ← U1:Ni [VX|Z ∩HX|Y ]
6: F ′i ← U1:Ni [HX|Y \VX|Z ]
7: Transmit Mi ← [Fi, F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1] publicly to Bob
8: end for
9: return K1:k ← [K1,K2, . . . ,Kk]
Algorithm 2 Bob’s decoding algorithm for Model 1
Require: The secret key K˜0 and the set AXY Z defined in
Algorithm 1; for every Block i ∈ J1, kK, the observations
Y 1:Ni from the source and the message Mi transmitted by
Alice.
1: for Block i = 1 to k do
2: Form U1:Ni [HX|Y ] from Mi and K˜i−1
3: Create an estimate Û1:Ni of U
1:N
i with the successive
cancellation decoder of [26]
4: K̂i ← Û1:Ni [(VX|Z\HX|Y )\AXY Z ]
5: K˜i ← Û1:Ni [AXY Z ]
6: end for
7: return K̂1:k ← [K̂1, K̂2, . . . , K̂k]
Remark 1. For convenience, Algorithm 1 does not distinguish
the last block from the others; however, there is no need
to create a seed in Block k, so that one may actually use
U1:Nk [VX|Z\HX|Y ] as the key Kk and slightly increase the
key rate. For a large number of blocks k, this distinction has
negligible impact on the achievable rates.
Remark 2. The need for a seed is not an artifact of our proof,
4but a fundamental requirement of our single polarization
approach to generate secret keys and public messages. In fact,
a memoryless source cannot be near losslessly compressed at
a rate close to the entropy and simultaneously ensure that the
encoded messages are nearly uniformly distributed in varia-
tional distance [35, Section V]. In the context of secret-key
generation with polar codes, this translates into the condition
HX|Y 6⊂ VX|Z and in the impossibility of simultaneously
ensuring strong secrecy and reliability. Our solution follows
ideas from [36], [37], showing that the impossibility may be
circumvented if the encoder and the decoder share a small
seed beforehand; without seed, only weak secrecy would be
ensured.
As shown in Section III-C, a careful analysis of the algo-
rithms leads to the following result.
Theorem 2. Consider a BMS (XYZ, pXY Z). Assume that
Alice and Bob share a secret seed. The secret-key rate
I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) is achieved by the polar coding scheme
of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, which involves a chaining
of k blocks of size N , and whose computational complexity
is O(kN logN). Moreover, the seed rate can be chosen in
o
(
2−N
α)
, α < 1/2.
Proof: See Section III-C.
Corollary 2. When X → Y → Z, the secret-key capacity
of Theorem 1 is achieved by the polar coding scheme of
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Moreover, one does not need
to encode over several blocks, i.e., one can choose k = 1, and
the seed rate is o(N). However, encoding over several blocks
for this case allows one to reduce the seed rate from o(N) to
o(2−N
α
), α < 1/2.
Proof: See Appendix A-A.
Note that, in the special case of a symmetric degraded
BMS,2 Corollary 2 may be indirectly obtained from wiretap
codes and [23], following the approach of [2], [17, Section
4.2.1]. However, this indirect proof might not translate into
practical implementations because it requires much more pub-
lic channel communication.
Although the seed rate in Theorem 2 or Corollary 2 may be
made arbitrarily small, it is valuable to identify examples for
which no seed is required. We provide two such examples in
Proposition 1, which corresponds to the privacy amplification
setting of [38], and in Proposition 2, which corresponds
to a case when the source has uniform marginals and the
eavesdropper has no access to correlated observations of the
source.
Proposition 1. Consider a BMS (XYZ, pXY Z). Assume that
Alice and Bob have the same observations, i.e., X = Y ; then
the secret-key capacity CWSK = H(X|Z) is achievable with
a polar coding scheme, whose computational complexity is
O(N logN).
Proof: See Appendix A-B.
2That is, when X , Y , and Z are connected by symmetric channels.
Ki
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Mi
Block i+ 1
F 0i+1
F 0i+1   eKi Mi+1
Fi+1eKi+1
Z1:Ni+1
Ki+1
X1:Ni+1
Fig. 2. Functional dependence graph of the proposed block encoding scheme
described in Algorithm 1
Proposition 2. Consider a BMS (XY, pXY ) with X ∼
B(1/2). The secret-key capacity CSK(+∞) given in Corol-
lary 1 is achievable with perfect secrecy with a polar coding
scheme, whose computational complexity is O(N logN).
Proof: See Appendix A-C.
Note that the model studied in Proposition 2 includes [39,
Model 1] as a special case, and does not require the construc-
tion of a standard array, whose size grows exponentially with
the blocklength.
C. Analysis of polar coding scheme: proof of Theorem 2
A functional dependence graph of the block encoding
scheme of Section III-B is depicted in Figure 2 to help
the reader identify the dependencies among the variables
introduced by the block-coding scheme.
1) Preliminary result: We first state a lemma that will be
useful for the scheme analysis.
Lemma 1. The set VX|Z is such that
lim
N→+∞
|VX|Z |/N = H(X|Z).
Proof: See Appendix A-D.
Note that limN→+∞|HX|Y |/N = H(X|Y ) follows
from [26], but Lemma 1 requires a slightly different proof
based on Lemma 16 in the appendix.
2) Existence of AXY Z: Observe that
|VX|Z\HX|Y |−|HX|Y \VX|Z |= |VX|Z |−|HX|Y |.
Hence, by Lemma 1 and [26], we have
lim
N→∞
(|VX|Z\HX|Y |−|HX|Y \VX|Z |)/N
= H(X|Z)−H(X|Y ).
Since I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) > 0 by assumption, we conclude
that |VX|Z\HX|Y |−|HX|Y \VX|Z |> 0 for N large enough and
AXY Z exists.
3) Asymptotic key rate: For i ∈ J1, kK, we note |Ki| the
length of the vector Ki. The length of the overall key generated
5is
|K1:k| =
k∑
i=1
|Ki|
= k|(VX|Z\HX|Y )\AXY Z |
= k(|VX|Z\HX|Y |−|HX|Y \VX|Z |)
= k(|VX|Z |−|HX|Y |).
Hence, by Lemma 1 and [26], the asymptotic key rate is
lim
N→∞
|K1:k|
kN
> I(X;Y )− I(X;Z).
4) Reliability: Let i ∈ J2, kK. Note that F ′i is correctly
received only when Bob possesses a correct estimate of the
seed K˜i−1, i.e., when U1:Ni−1 is correctly reconstructed. We note
F̂ ′i the estimate of F
′
i formed by Bob from (Û
1:N
i−1 ,Mi) and
define the event EF ′i , {F ′i 6= F̂ ′i}. Then,
P[Ki 6= K̂i]
6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni ]
= P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |EcF ′i ]P[E
c
F ′i
] + P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |EF ′i ]P[EF ′i ]
6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |EcF ′i ] + P[EF ′i ]
6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |EcF ′i ] + P[U
1:N
i−1 6= Û1:Ni−1 ]
(a)
6 NδN + P[U1:Ni−1 6= Û1:Ni−1 ]
(b)
6 (i− 1)NδN + P[U1:N1 6= Û1:N1 ]
(c)
6 iNδN ,
where (a) follows because Bob can reconstruct U1:Ni from
(Fi, F
′
i ) = U
1:N
i [HX|Y ] and Y 1:Ni with error probability less
than NδN [26], (b) holds by induction, (c) holds by [26] and
because K˜0 is known to Bob. Using the union bound,
Pe(SN ) = P[K1:k 6= K̂1:k]
6
k∑
i=1
P[Ki 6= K̂i]
6
k∑
i=1
iNδN
=
k(k + 1)
2
NδN . (1)
5) Key uniformity: We first prove the uniformity of the key
in each block i using the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In every block i ∈ J1, kK, the vector [Ki, K˜i] is
nearly uniform, in the sense that
|Ki|+|K˜i|−H(KiK˜i) 6 NδN .
In particular, |K˜i|−H(K˜i) 6 NδN and |Ki|−H(Ki) 6
NδN .
Proof: For i ∈ J1, kK, we have
|Ki|+|K˜i|−H(KiK˜i)
= |Ki|+|K˜i|−H(U1:Ni [VX|Z\HX|Y ])
(a)
6 |Ki|+|K˜i|−
∑
j∈VX|Z\HX|Y
H(U ji |U1:j−1i )
(b)
6 |Ki|+|K˜i|−
∑
j∈VX|Z\HX|Y
(1− δN )
= (|Ki|+|K˜i|)δN
6 NδN ,
where (a) holds because conditioning reduces entropy, (b)
holds by definition of VX|Z and because conditioning reduces
entropy. Finally, note that since |Ki|−H(Ki|K˜i) > 0, we have
|K˜i|−H(K˜i) 6 |K˜i|−H(K˜i) + |Ki|−H(Ki|K˜i)
= |Ki|+|K˜i|−H(KiK˜i).
It remains to show that the overall key K1:k is uniform, as
well. Specifically, we have
H(K1:k) =
k∑
i=1
H(Ki|K1:i−1)
(a)
=
k∑
i=1
H(Ki)
(b)
>
k∑
i=1
(|Ki|−NδN )
= |K1:k|−kNδN ,
where (a) holds because X1:Ni is independent of of X
1:N
1:i−1
for any i ∈ J1, kK, and (b) holds by Lemma 2. Hence,
U(SN ) = |K1:k|−H(K1:k) 6 kNδN . (2)
6) Strong secrecy: We first show that secrecy holds for each
block using the following lemma .
Lemma 3. For each Block i ∈ J1, kK, [Ki, K˜i] is a secret key.
Specifically,
I
(
KiK˜i;MiZ
1:N
i
)
6 2NδN .
Proof: We have
I(KiK˜i;FiZ
1:N
i )
= H(KiK˜i)−H(KiK˜i|FiZ1:Ni )
6 |Ki|+|K˜i|−H(KiK˜iFi|Z1:Ni ) +H(Fi|Z1:Ni )
6 |Ki|+|K˜i|+|Fi|−H(KiK˜iFi|Z1:Ni )
(a)
= |VX|Z\HX|Y |+|VX|Z ∩HX|Y |
−H(U1:Ni [(VX|Z\HX|Y ) ∪ (VX|Z ∩HX|Y )]|Z1:Ni )
= |VX|Z |−H(U1:Ni [VX|Z ]|Z1:Ni )
(b)
6 |VX|Z |−
∑
j∈VX|Z
H(U ji |U1:j−1i Z1:Ni )
6(c)
6 |VX|Z |−
∑
j∈VX|Z
(1− δN )
= |VX|Z |δN
6 NδN , (3)
where (a) holds by definition of Ki, K˜i, and Fi, (b) holds
because conditioning reduces entropy, (c) holds by definition
of VX|Z . Therefore, we obtain
I(KiK˜i;MiZ
1:N
i )
(d)
= I(KiK˜i;Fi(F
′
i ⊕ K˜i−1)Z1:Ni )
= I(KiK˜i;FiZ
1:N
i ) + I(KiK˜i;F
′
i ⊕ K˜i−1|FiZ1:Ni )
(e)
6 NδN + I(KiK˜iFiZ1:Ni F ′i ;F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1)
= NδN +H(F
′
i ⊕ K˜i−1)−H(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1|KiK˜iFiZ1:Ni F ′i )
= NδN +H(F
′
i ⊕ K˜i−1)−H(K˜i−1|KiK˜iFiZ1:Ni F ′i )
= NδN +H(F
′
i ⊕ K˜i−1)−H(K˜i−1)
6 NδN + |K˜i−1|−H(K˜i−1)
(f)
6 2NδN ,
where (d) holds by definition of Mi, (e) holds by (3) and
positivity of mutual information, (f) holds by Lemma 2.
We now state two lemmas that will be used to show that
secrecy holds for the global scheme.
Lemma 4. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have for N large enough
I(Ki; K˜i) 6 δ∗N ,
where
δ∗N , 3
√
2NδN log 2
(
N − log2
(
3
√
2NδN log 2
))
. (4)
Proof: See Appendix A-E
Lemma 5. For i ∈ J2, kK, define
L˜1:ie , I
(
K1:iK˜i;M1:iZ
1:N
1:i
)
.
We have
L˜1:ie − L˜1:i−1e 6 I
(
KiK˜i;MiZ
1:N
i
)
+ I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1
)
.
Proof: See Appendix A-F.
We thus obtain
L(SN )
= I(K1:k;M1:kZ
1:N
1:k )
6 L˜1:ke
=
k∑
i=2
(L˜1:ie − L˜1:i−1e ) + L˜1e
(a)
6
k∑
i=2
(
I
(
KiK˜i;MiZ
1:N
i
)
+ I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1
))
+ L˜1e
6
k∑
i=1
I
(
KiK˜i;MiZ
1:N
i
)
+
k∑
i=2
I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1
)
(b)
6 2kNδN + (k − 1)δ∗N , (5)
!
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Fig. 3. Model 2: Secret-key generation for the BMS model with one-way
rate-limited public communication
where (a) follows by Lemma 5, (b) follows by Lemma 4 and
Lemma 3.
7) Seed rate: The seed rate required to initialize the coding
scheme is negligible since
lim
k→∞
lim
N→∞
|HX|Y \VX|Z |
kN
6 lim
k→∞
H(X|Y )
k
= 0.
Note that the seed rate may be chosen to decrease expo-
nentially fast to zero with N since we may choose k =
2N
α
, α < β and still have limN→∞Pe(SN ) = 0 by (1),
limN→∞Ue(SN ) = 0 by (2), and limN→∞ Le(SN ) = 0
by (5) and (4).
IV. MODEL 2: SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH
RATE-LIMITED PUBLIC COMMUNICATION
We now move to the second key generation model, which
differs from Model 1 by restricting the public communication
to be rate-limited and one way from Alice to Bob. The
organization follows that of Section III.
A. Secret-key generation model
As illustrated in Fig. 3, we set again m = 2 and we use X
instead of X1, Y instead of X2 for convenience. We assume
that X = {0, 1} and that Alice and Bob are constrained to only
use one-way communication over an authenticated noiseless
public channel with limited rate Rp ∈ R. We call this setup
the BMS model with rate-limited public communication. The
following results are known for the model.
Theorem 3 ([4, Th. 2.6]). Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a BMS and
Rp ∈ R+ be the public communication rate. If X → Y → Z,
then the one-way rate-limited secret-key capacity is3
CWSK(Rp) = max
U
(I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U))
subject to Rp = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
U → X → Y → Z,
|U|6 |X |.
Closed-form expressions of the secret-key capacity are only
known for specific sources. See the following example.
Example 1. Assume X = Y = Z = {0, 1} and X ∼ B(1/2).
Set Y , X ⊕ B1 and Z , Y ⊕ B2, with B1 ∼ B(p), B2 ∼
3See also [11, Prop. 5.2, Rem. 5.2] and [40, Cor. 6] for the exact derivation.
7B(q), where ⊕ denotes the modulo-2 addition. Then, by [11,
Prop. 5.3], the secret-key capacity is
CWSK(Rp)
,
{
Hb(p ? β0 ? q)−Hb(p ? β0), if Rp 6 H(X|Y ),
Hb(p ? q)−Hb(p), if Rp > H(X|Y ),
where β0 must satisfy4
Hb(p ? β0)−Hb(β0) = Rp, (6)
Hb(·) is the binary entropy function, and the associative and
commutative operation ? is defined as p ? β0 = (1 − β0)p +
β0(1− p).
When the eavesdropper has no access to the source compo-
nent Z, one obtains the following expression for the secret-key
capacity.
Corollary 3. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a BMS and Rp ∈ R+
be the public communication rate. The one-way rate-limited
secret-key capacity is
CSK(Rp) = max
U
I(Y ;U)
subject to Rp = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
U → X → Y,
|U|6 |X |.
The practical justification for Model 2 is similar to that
for Model 1; however, Model 2 allows us to account for
rate-limited communication constraints, which is relevant in
applications with stringent bandwidth constraints, such as
wireless sensor networks. We will also see in Section VII that
such constraint may account for privacy-leakage constraints in
biometric systems.
The main challenge in designing a coding scheme for
Model 2 is to address the problem of vector quantization with
side information at the receiver. Previous polar coding results
on lossy source coding with lossless reconstruction of the
vector quantized version of the source are reported in [41],
[42]; our contribution is to extend these results when side
information is available at the receiver, and to show how to
apply such technique to secret-key generation with rate-limited
public communication.
B. Polar coding scheme
Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. Fix a joint probability distribution
pXU such that I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) > 0, but we do not assume
X → Y → Z. Denote V 1:N , U1:NGN , the polar transform
of a vector U1:N with i.i.d components according to the
marginal distribution pU . For δN , 2−N
β
, where β ∈]0, 1/2[,
define the following sets.
HU ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (V i|V 1:i−1) > δN} ,
VU |Z ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (V i|V 1:i−1Z1:N) > 1− δN} ,
VU |Y ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (V i|V 1:i−1Y 1:N) > 1− δN} ,
HU |Y ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (V i|V 1:i−1Y 1:N) > δN} ,
HU |X ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (V i|V 1:i−1X1:N) > δN} .
4 Note that (6) has two symmetric solutions.
The encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algo-
rithm 3 and Algorithm 4. The high-level principles are similar
to that of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, and we only highlight
here the differences. Instead of directly operating on the source
symbols, Alice first constructs a vector quantized version V˜ 1:N
of X1:N , whose distribution is close to that of V 1:N . This
statement is made more precise in Lemma 6, but a crucial
part of the proof is to introduce a stochastic encoder, as in
successive cancellation encoding for lossy source coding [41],
[42]. The randomness R1 used in the encoder is publicly
transmitted to Bob and reused over several blocks so that
its rate vanishes to zero as the number of blocks increases;
however, reusing R1 creates additional dependencies between
the variables of the different blocks, which must be carefully
taken into account in the secrecy analysis. The choice of public
messages and keys is then similar to those in Section III-B,
using V˜ 1:N instead of X1:N .
Algorithm 3 Alice’s encoding algorithm for Model 2
Require: K˜0, a secret key of size |(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |
shared by Alice and Bob beforehand; for every Block
i ∈ J1, kK, the observations X1:Ni from the source; AUY Z
a subset of VU |Z\HU |Y with size |(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |;
a vector R1 of |VU |X | uniformly distributed bits.
1: Transmit R1 publicly to Bob
2: for Block i = 1 to k do
3: Ri ← R1
4: V˜ 1:Ni [VU |X ]← Ri
5: Given X1:Ni , successively draw the remaining
bits of V˜ 1:Ni according to p˜V 1:Ni X1:Ni ,∏N
j=1 p˜V ji |V j−1i X1:N pX1:N with
p˜V ji |V 1:j−1i X1:N (v
j |V˜ 1:j−1i X1:Ni )
,
{
pV j |V 1:j−1X1:N (vj |V˜ 1:j−1i X1:Ni ) if j∈ HU\VU |X
pV j |V 1:j−1(vj |V˜ 1:j−1i ) if j∈ HcU
(7)
6: K˜i ← V˜ 1:Ni [AUY Z ]
7: Ki ← V˜ 1:Ni [(VU |Z\HU |Y )\AUY Z ]
8: Fi ← V˜ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X) ∩ VU |Z ]
9: F ′i , V˜ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z ]
10: Transmit Mi ← [Fi, F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1] publicly to Bob.
11: end for
12: return K1:k ← [K1,K2, . . . ,Kk]
Remark 3. One may actually use U1:Nk [VU |Z\HU |Y ] as the
key Kk and slightly increase the key rate in Algorithm 3.
However, one does not distinguish the last block from the
others for convenience – see Remark 1.
As shown in Section IV-C, the analysis of Algorithm 3 and
Algotithm 4 leads to the following result.
Theorem 4. Consider a BMS (XYZ, pXY Z). Assume that
Alice and Bob share a secret seed and let Rp ∈ R+ be the
8Algorithm 4 Bob’s decoding algorithm for Model 2
Require: The secret key K˜0 and the set AUY Z defined in
Algorithm 3; for every Block i ∈ J1, kK, the observations
Y 1:Ni from the source, the message Mi. transmitted by
Alice; the vector R1 transmitted by Alice.
1: for Block i = 1 to k do
2: Form V˜ 1:Ni [HU |Y ] from (Mi, K˜i−1, Ri)
3: Create an estimate V̂ 1:Ni of V
1:N
i with the successive
cancellation decoder of [26]
4: K̂i ← V̂ 1:Ni [(VU |Z\HU |Y )\AUY Z ]
5: K˜i ← V̂ 1:Ni [AUY Z ]
6: end for
7: return K̂1:k ← [K̂1, K̂2, . . . , K̂k]
public communication rate. The secret-key rate defined by
max
U
(I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U))
subject to Rp = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
U → X → Y,
|U|6 |X |.
is achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 3 and
Algorithm 4, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size
N , and whose computational complexity is O(kN logN).
Moreover, the seed rate can be chosen in o
(
2−N
α)
, α < 1/2.
Proof: See Section IV-C.
The following corollary states sufficient conditions to avoid
block encoding.
Corollary 4. If X → Y → Z, X ∼ B(1/2), and the test-
channels pY |X and pZ|X are symmetric,5 then the secret-key
capacity of Theorem 3 is achieved by the polar coding scheme
for Block 1 in Algorithm 3 with AUY Z = ∅, R1 a constant
sequence, and a seed rate in o(N).
Proof: See Appendix B-A.
Finally, the following proposition provides sufficient con-
ditions to avoid block encoding and a pre-shared seed. The
proof is similar to that of Theorem 4 and Corollary 4 and is
omitted.
Proposition 3. If the eavesdropper has no access to correlated
observations of the source, X ∼ B(1/2), and the test-channel
pY |X is symmetric, then the secret-key capacity of Corollary 3
is achieved by the polar coding scheme for Block 1 in Algo-
rithm 3 with AUY Z = ∅, Z = ∅, F ′1 = ∅, K1 , V˜ 1:N1 [HcU |Y ],
F1 , V˜ 1:N1 [HU |Y \VU |X ], and R1 a constant sequence.
C. Analysis of polar coding scheme: Proof of Theorem 4
A functional dependence graph for the coding scheme of
Section IV-B is depicted in Fig. 4 for convenience.
5As in Example 1 for instance
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Fig. 4. Functional dependence graph of the block encoding scheme
1) Preliminary result:
Lemma 6. For every i ∈ J1, kK, the random variable
V˜ 1:Ni resulting from Algorithm 3 has a joint distribution
p˜X1:Ni V 1:Ni , p˜V 1:Ni |X1:N pX1:N with X
1:N
i such that
D(pX1:NV 1:N ||p˜X1:Ni V 1:Ni ) 6 NδN ,
Hence, by Pinsker’s inequality
V(pX1:NV 1:N , p˜X1:Ni V 1:Ni ) 6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN .
Proof: See Appendix B-B.
2) Existence of AUY Z: Observe that
|VU |Z\HU |Y |−|(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |
= |VU |Z |−|HU |Y |+|(HU |Y ∩ VU |X)\VU |Z |
> |VU |Z |−|HU |Y |.
Hence, by Lemma 1 and [26], we have
lim
N→∞
(|VU |Z\HU |Y |−|(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |)/N
> H(U |Z)−H(U |Y ).
Since I(Y ;U) − I(Z;U) > 0, we have for N large enough
|VU |Z\HU |Y |−|(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |> 0, and we conclude
that AUY Z exists.
3) Communication rate: The total communication is
|R1|+
k∑
i=1
(|Fi|+|F ′i |)
= |R1|+
k∑
i=1
|HU |Y \VU |X |
= |VU |X |+k|HU |Y \VU |X |
= |VU |X |+k(|HU |Y |−|VU |X |)
where the last equality holds because U → X → Y and thus
VU |X ⊂ VU |Y ⊂ HU |Y . Hence, the communication rate is by
Lemma 1 and [26],
lim
N→∞
|VU |X |+k(|HU |Y |−|VU |X |)
kN
= I(X;U)− I(Y ;U) + H(U |X)
k
.
94) Key rate: The length of the key generated is
|K1:k| =
k∑
i=1
|Ki|
= k|(VU |Z\HU |Y )\AUY Z |
= k(|VU |Z |−|HU |Y |+|(HU |Y ∩ VU |X)\VU |Z |)
> k(|VU |Z |−|HU |Y |).
Hence, the key rate is by Lemma 1 and [26],
lim
N→∞
|K1:k|
kN
> I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U).
5) Reliability: For i ∈ J1, kK, Bob forms V̂ 1:Ni from
(Fi, F
′
i , Ri) = V˜
1:N
i [HU |Y ] and Y 1:Ni with the succes-
sive cancellation encoder of [26]. Consider an optimal cou-
pling [41], [43] between p˜V 1:Ni and pV 1:Ni such that P[E ] =
V(p˜V 1:Ni , pV 1:Ni ), where E , {V˜ 1:Ni 6= V 1:Ni }. For i ∈ J2, kK,
note that F ′i is correctly received only when Bob has correctly
estimated K˜i−1, i.e., when V˜ 1:Ni−1 is correctly reconstructed.
We note F̂ ′i the estimate of F
′
i formed by Bob from V˜
1:N
i−1 and
define EF ′i , {F ′i 6= F̂ ′i}. We then have
P[V̂ 1:Ni 6= V˜ 1:Ni ]
= P[V̂ 1:Ni 6= V˜ 1:Ni |E ∪ EF ′i ]P[E ∪ EF ′i ]
+ P[V̂ 1:Ni 6= V˜ 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]P[E
c ∩ EcF ′i ]
6 P[E ∪ EF ′i ] + P[V̂ 1:Ni 6= V˜ 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]
6 P[E ] + P[EF ′i ] + P[V̂ 1:Ni 6= V˜ 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]
= V(p˜V 1:Ni , pV 1:Ni ) + P[EF ′i ] + P[V̂
1:N
i 6= V˜ 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]
= V(p˜V 1:Ni , pV 1:Ni ) + P[EF ′i ] + P[V̂
1:N
i 6= V 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]
6 V(p˜X1:Ni V 1:Ni , pX1:Ni V 1:Ni )
+ P[EF ′i ] + P[V̂ 1:Ni 6= V 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]
(a)
6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN + P[EF ′i ] + P[V̂ 1:Ni 6= V 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]
(b)
6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN + P[EF ′i ] +NδN
6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN +NδN + P[V̂ 1:Ni−1 6= V˜ 1:Ni−1 ]
(c)
6 (i− 1)(
√
2 log 2
√
NδN +NδN ) + P[V̂ 1:N1 6= V˜ 1:N1 ]
(d)
6 i(
√
2 log 2
√
NδN +NδN ),
where (a) holds by Lemma 6, (b) holds because P[V̂ 1:Ni 6=
V 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ] 6 NδN by [26], (c) holds by induction, (d)
holds by [26] and because K˜0 is known to Bob.
Hence, P[Ki 6= K̂i] 6 i(
√
2 log 2
√
NδN + NδN ). Then,
similarly to Section III-C4, we obtain with a union bound
Pe(SN ) 6 k(k + 1)
2
(
√
2 log 2
√
NδN +NδN ). (8)
6) Key uniformity: We first show that the key is nearly
uniform for every block in the following lemma.
Lemma 7. For every block i ∈ J1, kK, the vector
[Ki, K˜i, Fi, R1] is nearly uniform, in the sense that
V(pKi,K˜i,Fi,R1 , qUK,K˜,F,R) 6 2
√
2 log 2
√
NδN ,
where qU
K,K˜,F,R
is the uniform distribution overJ1, 2|(VU|Z\HU|Y )∪((HU|Y \VU|X)∩VU|Z)∪VU|X |K.
Proof: We have
V(pKi,K˜i,Fi,Ri , qUK,K˜,F,R)
(a)
6 V(p˜V 1:Ni [VU ], qUVU )
(b)
6 V(p˜V 1:Ni [VU ], pV 1:Ni [VU ]) + V(pV 1:Ni [VU ], qUVU )
(c)
6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN + V(pV 1:Ni [VU ], qUVU )
(d)
6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN +
√
2 log 2
√
D(pV 1:Ni [VU ]||qUVU )
=
√
2 log 2
√
NδN +
√
2 log 2
√
|VU |−H(V 1:Ni [VU ])
(e)
6 2
√
2 log 2
√
NδN ,
where (a) holds because VU |Z ⊂ VU and VU |X ⊂ VU with
qUVU the uniform distribution over J1, 2|VU |K, (b) holds by
the triangle inequality, (c) holds by Lemma 6, (d) holds by
Pinsker’s inequality, (e) holds because similar to the proof of
Lemma 2, we have |VU |−H(V 1:Ni [VU ]) 6 NδN .
From Lemma 7, we derive the following lemmas.
Lemma 8. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have for N large enough
|Ki|+|K˜i|−H(KiK˜i) 6 δ(1)N ,
where
δ
(1)
N , 2
√
2 log 2
√
NδN (N − log2(2
√
2 log 2
√
NδN )). (9)
In particular, we also have |Ki|−H(Ki) 6 δ(1)N and
|K˜i|−H(K˜i) 6 δ(1)N .
Proof: See Appendix B-C.
Lemma 9. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have for N large enough
I(Ki; K˜iR1) 6 δ(2)N and I(K˜i;R1) 6 δ
(2)
N ,
where
δ
(2)
N , 6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN (N − log2(6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN )).
(10)
Proof: See Appendix B-D.
We now show that the global key K1:k is uniform. Specif-
ically, we have
H(K1:k) =
k∑
i=1
H(Ki|K1:i−1)
>
k∑
i=1
H(Ki|K1:i−1R1)
(a)
=
k∑
i=1
H(Ki|R1)
=
k∑
i=1
H(Ki)−
k∑
i=1
I(Ki;R1)
(b)
>
k∑
i=1
H(Ki)− kδ(2)N
10
(c)
>
k∑
i=1
(|Ki|−δ(1)N )− kδ(2)N
= |K1:k|−k(δ(1)N + δ(2)N )
where (a) holds because Ki → R1 → K1:i−1 for any i ∈J1, kK, (b) holds by Lemma 9, (c) holds by Lemma 8. Hence,
U(SN ) = |K1:k|−H(K1:k) 6 k(δ(1)N + δ(2)N ). (11)
7) Strong secrecy: Because of the successive cancellation
encoding, the secrecy analysis is more involved than for
Model 1.
Lemma 10. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have for N large enough
I(V˜ 1:Ni [VU |Z ];Z1:Ni ) 6 δ(3)N ,
where
δ
(3)
N , 3
√
2 log 2
√
NδN (N − log2(3
√
2 log 2
√
NδN )).
(12)
Proof: See Appendix B-E.
The following lemma shows that secrecy holds for each
block.
Lemma 11. For each Block i ∈ J1, kK, [Ki, K˜i] is a secret
key in the sense that
I
(
KiK˜i;R1MiZ
1:N
i
)
6 2δ(1)N + δ
(2)
N + δ
(3)
N .
Proof: By the proof of Lemma 7, we have
V(p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ], qUVU|Z ) 6 2
√
2 log 2
√
NδN ,
where qUVU|Z is the uniform distribution over J1, 2|VU|Z |K, and
by the proof of Lemma 8, we have
|VU |Z |−H(V 1:Ni [VU |Z ]) 6 δ(1)N . (13)
Therefore,
I(KiK˜i;R1FiZ
1:N
i )
= H(KiK˜i)−H(KiK˜i|R1FiZ1:Ni )
6 |Ki|+|K˜i|−H(KiK˜iR1FiZ1:Ni ) +H(R1FiZ1:Ni )
= |Ki|+|K˜i|−H(KiK˜iR1Fi|Z1:Ni ) +H(FiR1|Z1:Ni )
6 |Ki|+|K˜i|+|Fi|+|R1|−H(KiK˜iR1Fi|Z1:Ni )
(a)
6 |VU |Z |−H(V˜ 1:Ni [VU |Z ]|Z1:Ni )
= |VU |Z |−H(V˜ 1:Ni [VU |Z ]) + I(V˜ 1:Ni [VU |Z ];Z1:Ni )
(b)
6 δ(1)N + I(V˜ 1:Ni [VU |Z ];Z1:Ni )
(c)
6 δ(1)N + δ
(3)
N , (14)
where (a) holds because (Ki, K˜i, R1, Fi) is a subvector of
V˜ 1:Ni [VU |Z ] noting that VU |X ⊂ VU |Z since U → X → Z,
(b) holds by (13), (c) holds by Lemma 10.
Then, we obtain
I(KiK˜i;R1MiZ
1:N
i )− I(KiK˜i;R1FiZ1:Ni )
(d)
= I(KiK˜i;F
′
i ⊕ K˜i−1|R1FiZ1:Ni )
(e)
6 I(R1KiK˜iFiF ′iZ1:Ni ;F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1)
= H(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1)−H(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1|R1KiK˜iFiF ′iZ1:Ni )
= H(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1)−H(K˜i−1|R1KiK˜iFiF ′iZ1:Ni )
(f)
= H(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1)−H(K˜i−1|R1)
6 |K˜i−1|−H(K˜i−1|R1)
= |K˜i−1|−H(K˜i−1) + I(K˜i−1;R1)
(g)
6 δ(1)N + δ
(2)
N , (15)
where (d) holds by definition of Mi, (e) holds by the chain
rule and positivity of mutual information, (f) holds because
K˜i−1 → R1 → KiK˜iFiF ′iZ1:Ni , (g) holds by Lemma 8 and
Lemma 9. Finally, we conclude by combining (14) and (15).
We now state a lemma that will be used to show that secrecy
holds for the global scheme.
Lemma 12. For i ∈ J2, kK, define
L˜1:ie , I
(
K1:iK˜i;R1M1:iZ
1:N
1:i
)
.
We have
L˜1:ie − L˜1:i−1e 6 I
(
KiK˜i;R1MiZ
1:N
i
)
+
i−1∑
j=1
I (Kj ;R1) + I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1R1
)
.
Proof: See Appendix B-F.
We thus obtain
L(SN )
= I(K1:k;M1:kZ
1:N
1:k )
6 L˜1:ke
=
k∑
i=2
(L˜1:ie − L˜1:i−1e ) + L˜1e
(a)
6
k∑
i=2
(
I
(
KiK˜i;R1MiZ
1:N
i
)
+
i−1∑
j=1
I (Kj ;R1) + I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1R1
)+ L˜1e
(b)
6
k∑
i=2
(
I
(
KiK˜i;R1MiZ
1:N
i
)
+ iδ
(2)
N
)
+ L˜1e
=
(k − 1)(k + 2)
2
δ
(2)
N + L˜
1
e +
k∑
i=2
I
(
KiK˜i;R1MiZ
1:N
i
)
(c)
6 (k − 1)(k + 2)
2
δ
(2)
N + k(2δ
(1)
N + δ
(2)
N + δ
(3)
N ) (16)
where (a) follows from Lemma 12, (b) holds by Lemma 9,
(c) holds by Lemma 11.
11
ENC 
DEC
Encoder
Decoder K1
ENC 
DEC
Encoder
Decoder
ENC 
DEC
Encoder
DecoderK2 Km
Terminal 1 Terminal 2 Terminal m
p1
XN1 ⇠ B(p)
pm 1
noiseless authenticated public channel with unlimited rate
X1:N1 X
1:N
2 X
1:N
m
X1:N1
Fig. 5. Model 3: Secret-key generation for the 1-to-m broadcast model
8) Seed rate: The seed rate required to initialize the coding
scheme is
lim
k→∞
lim
N→∞
|(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |
kN
6 lim
k→∞
H(U |Y )
k
= 0.
Note that the seed rate could be chosen to decrease exponen-
tially fast to zero with N , since we may choose k = 2N
α
,
α < β, and still have limN→∞Pe(SN ) = 0 by (8),
limN→∞Ue(SN ) = 0 by (11), and limN→∞ Le(SN ) = 0
by (16) along with (9), (10), (12).
V. MODEL 3: A MULTITERMINAL BROADCAST MODEL
In this section, we develop a polar coding scheme for a
multiterminal broadcast model. Sections V-A to V-C analyze
a model with an arbitrary number of terminals but specific
source statistics. The extension of the model to general sources
is discussed in Section V-D for the case of three terminals.
A. Secret-key generation model
As illustrated in Fig. 5, we assume that every Terminal i ∈
M\{1} observes a degraded version of the observation of
Terminal 1. For i ∈ M, we assume that Xi = {0, 1} and
for i ∈ M\{1}, we set Xi = X1 ⊕ Bi, with X1 ∼ B(p) and
Bi ∼ B(pi−1), pi−1 ∈ [0, 1], independent of X1. Furthermore,
we suppose that the eavesdropper does not have access to
an observation of the source. We call this setup the 1-to-m
broadcast model, and we recall expression of the secret-key
capacity in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 ( [4]). Consider the 1-to-m broadcast model.
The secret-key capacity CSK(+∞) is given by
CSK(+∞) = min
i∈M\{1}
I(X1;Xi).
B. Polar coding scheme
Define imin , argmini∈M\{1}I(X1;Xi) such that
imin − 1 = arg max
i∈M\{m}
pi.
Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. We set U1:N , X1:N1 GN . For
δN , 2−N
β
, where β ∈]0, 1/2[, define for j ∈ M\{1} the
sets
HX1|Xj ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1X1:Nj ) > δN} .
We also define the sets
VX1 ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1) > 1− δN} ,
HX1 ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1) > δN} .
The encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algo-
rithm 5 and Algorithm 6, respectively. The high-level principle
behind the operation of the algorithm is the following. The set
HX1|Xi contains the indices such that U1:N [HX1|Xi ] allows
Terminal i ∈ M\{1} to near losslessly reconstruct U1:N
from X1:Ni by [26]. Using a universality argument formalized
in Lemma 13, we will show that it is actually sufficient to
transmit U1:N [HX1|Ximin ] to allow all the terminals to near
losslessly reconstruct U1:N . The secret key common to all
terminals may then be chosen as a subset of U1:N [VX1 ];
since U1:N [HX1|Ximin ] has been publicly transmitted, the
secret-key is chosen as U1:N [VX1\HX1|Ximin ]. In general,HX1|Ximin 6⊂ VX1 , and the public communication may leak
some information about the key; consequently, as in Model 1
and Model 2, the protocol requires a pre-shared seed to protect
the transmission of U1:N [HX1|Ximin\VX1 ].
Algorithm 5 Encoding algorithm for Terminal 1 in Model 3
Require: K˜, a secret key of size |HX1|Ximin\VX1 | shared by
all terminals beforehand; the observations X1:N1 from the
source.
1: U1:N ← X1:N1 GN
2: K ← U1:N [VX1\HX1|Ximin ]
3: F , U1:N [VX1 ∩HX1|Ximin ]
4: F ′ , U1:N [HX1|Ximin \VX1 ]
5: Transmit M ← [F, F ′ ⊕ K˜] publicly to Terminals
{Xj}j∈M\1
6: return K
Algorithm 6 Decoding algorithm for Terminal j ∈ M \ {1}
for Model 3
Require: K˜, a secret key of size |HX1|Ximin\VX1 | shared by
all terminals beforehand; the observations X1:Nj from the
source, the message M transmitted by Terminal 1.
1: Form Û1:N from M and K˜ using the successive cancel-
lation decoder of [26].
2: K̂ ← Û1:N [VX1\HX1|Ximin ]
3: return K̂
As shown in Section V-C, we have the following result.
Theorem 5. Consider the 1-to-m broadcast model of Sec-
tion V-A. Assume that all terminals share a seed, whose rate
can be chosen in o(N). The secret-key capacity CSK(+∞)
given in Proposition 4 is achieved by the polar coding scheme
in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6, whose computational com-
plexity is O(N logN).
Proof: See Section V-C.
The following corollary shows that no seed is required when
the source has uniform marginals.
12
Corollary 5. Consider the 1-to-m broadcast model. Assume
that the source has uniform marginal, that is, X1 ∼ B(1/2).
The secret-key capacity CSK(+∞) given in Proposition 4 is
achievable with perfect secrecy with the polar coding scheme
of Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 choosing F ′ = ∅ and
replacing the set VX1 by HX1 wherever it appears.
We omit the proof of Corollary 5, which is similar to the
ones of Theorem 5 and Proposition 2. Note that the model
studied in Corollary 5 is a particular case of [39, Model 3].
However, the construction proposed in [39, Model 3] relies
again on a standard array, whose size grows exponentially
with the blocklength. Note also that a polar coding scheme
is proposed in Section VI for [39, Model 3].
C. Analysis of polar coding scheme: Proof of Theorem 5
1) Key rate: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4, we can
show that the key rate is
lim
N→+∞
|VX1\HX1|Ximin |
N
= I(X1;Ximin).
2) Seed rate: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4, we can
show that the seed rate is
lim
N→+∞
|HX1|Ximin\VX1 |
N
= 0.
3) Reliability: We make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 13. For j ∈ M\{1, imin}, we have HX1|Xj ⊂
HX1|Ximin .
Proof: Let j ∈M\{1, imin}. We define B˜(j)imin , Bj +∆j ,
with ∆j independent of Bj and such that pB˜(j)imin
= pBimin . We
set X˜(j)imin , X1 + B˜
(j)
imin
. Hence, since Bimin ∼ B(pimin−1), we
have for any x, y ∈ {0, 1},
p
X˜
(j)
imin
|X1(x|y)
= (1− 1{x = y})pimin−1 + 1{x = y}(1− pimin−1)
= pXimin |X1(x|y),
that is, p
X1X˜
(j)
imin
= pX1Ximin . We now define the sets
H
X1|X˜(j)imin
,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H(Ui|U i−1 (X˜(j)imin)1:N)> δN} .
By the data processing equality, we have HX1|Xj ⊂ HX1|X˜(j)imin
but we also have H
X1|X˜(j)imin
= HX1|Ximin since pX1X˜(j)imin =
pX1Ximin , whence HX1|Xj ⊂ HX1|Ximin .
By [26, Theorem 3] and by Lemma 13, for j ∈M\{1}, Ter-
minal j can reconstruct K from [F, F ′] = UN [HX1|Ximin ] ⊃
UN [HX1|Xj ] with error probability Pe(SN ) 6 NδN .
4) Strong secrecy and key uniformity: Secrecy and unifor-
mity hold since,
L(SN ) +U(SN )
= I (K;F ) + log|K|−H(K)
= |K|−H (K|F )
= |K|−H (KF ) +H(F )
6 |F |+|K|−H (KF )
= |VX1 ∩HX1|Ximin |+|VX1\HX1|Ximin |−H(U1:N [VX1 ])
= |VX1 |−H(U1:N [VX1 ])
6 NδN ,
where the last inequality can be shown as in the proof of
Theorem 4.
D. An extension to general sources
The multiterminal model described in Section V-A only
considers binary symmetric channels between the components
of the source. A natural question is whether a similar coding
scheme may be developed for general sources. We answer this
by the affirmative for the case of three terminals; however, the
coding scheme is significantly more involved than the one in
Section V-B. In the following, we can assume without loss of
generality that
I(X1;X2) = max
j∈{1,2,3}
min
i∈{1,2,3}\{j}
I(Xj ;Xi).
Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. We note U1:N , X21:NGN , and for
δN , 2−N
β
, where β ∈]0, 1/2[, we define the following sets
VX2 ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1) > 1− δN} ,
HX2|X1 ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1X1:N1 ) > δN} ,
HX2|X3 ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1X1:N3 ) > δN} .
We also define
KXM , (VX2\HX2|X1)\HX2|X3
K¯XM , (VX2\HX2|X1) ∩HX2|X3 ,
which are such that VX2\HX2|X1 = KXM∪K¯XM and KXM∩
K¯XM = ∅. Finally, we define
FX2|X1 , HX2|X1 ∩ VX2 ,
F¯X2|X1 , HX2|X1\VX2 ,
FX2|X3 , HX2|X3 ∩ VX2 ,
F¯X2|X3 , HX2|X3\VX2 ,
which are such that HX2|X1 = FX2|X1 ∪ F¯X2|X1 , FX2|X1 ∩
F¯X2|X1 = ∅, HX2|X3 = FX2|X3 ∪ F¯X2|X3 , and FX2|X3 ∩
F¯X2|X3 = ∅.
The encoding and decoding algorithms are provided in
Algorithm 7, Algorithm 8, and Algorithm 9. The underlying
principle is to make Terminals 1 and 3 reconstruct X1:N2 and
to choose the secret key as a subset of U1:N . For the public
communication, we perform universal source coding with side
information with an idea similar to [44]. Terminal 2 thus
performs encoding over k blocks of size N to transmit the
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side information necessary to reconstruct X1:kN2 at Terminals
1 and 3. Specifically, Terminal 1 decodes the blocks in order
from 1 to k, so that it is able to estimate U1:Ni [HX2|X1 ] by
processing the observations and the public communication in
blocks 1 to i. In contrast, Terminal 3 decodes the blocks in
reverse order starting from k down to 1, so that it is able
to estimate U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ] by processing the observations and
the public communication in blocks k down to i. One of the
challenges is to extract a uniform key from U1:N1:k independent
of the public communication messages, which we address by
protecting some of the public communication corresponding
to Block i with part of the secret-key extracted in Block i−1.
Moreover, similarly to Algorithms 1 and 3, a small secret seed
must be shared by the users to protect the bits in positions
HX2|X1\VX2∪HX2|X3\VX2 , which must be revealed to allow
reconstruction of the secret-key by Terminals 1 and 3, but that
may also leak information about the secret key.
The following remarks clarify why Algorithms 7, 8, and 9
achieve the desired behavior.
Remark 4. In every block i, Terminal 1 observes Mi =
[F
(1)
i ⊕ K¯i−1, F (2)i , F ′i ⊕ K˜i]. Using its estimate of the key K¯i
from the previous block, Terminal 1 estimates [F (1)i , F
(2)
i , F
′
i ],
which contains U1:Ni [HX2|X1 ] by construction. Hence, Termi-
nal 1 has ability to run the successive cancellation decoder
and reconstruct U1:Ni .
Remark 5. In Block k, Terminal 3 has access to F (2)k , F
′
k,
and F¯k using Mk and K˜k. Since FXM ⊂ FX2|X1\FX2|X3 ,
note that
FX2|X1\FXM = FX2|X1 ∩ FcXM
⊃ FX2|X1 ∩ (FX2|X1\FX2|X3)c
= FX2|X1 ∩ FX2|X3 .
Hence U1:Nk [FX2|X1 ∩FX2|X3 ] ⊂ F (2)k , which combined with
F¯k and F ′k allows Terminal 3 to obtain U
1:N
k [HX2|X3 ]. Hence,
Terminal 3 has the ability to run the successive cancellation
decoder and reconstruct Û1:Nk .
For Block i ∈ Jk − 1, 1K, observe that if Û1:Ni+1 [FXM ] =
U1:Ni+1 [FXM ], then we have
[F
(1)
i+1 ⊕ K¯i ⊕ Û1:Ni+1 [FXM ], F (2)i , F ′i ]
= [U1:Ni [K¯XM ], F (2)i , F ′i ]
= [U1:Ni [FX2|X3\FX2|X1 ], F (2)i , F ′i ]
⊃ [U1:Ni [FX2|X3\FX2|X1 ], U1:Ni [FX2|X1 ∩ FX2|X3 ], F ′i ]
⊃ U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ].
Consequently, Terminal 3 can form an estimate of
U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ] with
[F
(1)
i+1 ⊕ K¯i ⊕ Û1:Ni+1 [FXM ], F (2)i , F ′i ]
and apply the successive cancellation decoder to form Û1:Ni
an estimate of U1:Ni .
Theorem 6. Assume the general setting of Section II with
m = 3, X1 = X2 = X3 = {0, 1}, rate-unlimited public
communication, i.e., Rp = +∞, and Z = ∅, i.e., the
Algorithm 7 Encoding algorithm for Terminal 2 in Model 3
Require: k independent secret keys {K˜i}i∈J1,kK of size
|F¯X2|X1 ∪ F¯X2|X3 | shared by all terminals beforehand;
for every block i ∈ J1, kK, the observations (X2)1:Ni from
the source. FXM , a subset of FX2|X1\FX2|X3 with size
|K¯XM |.
1: for Block i = 1 to k do
2: if i = 1 then
3: U1:N1 ← (X2)1:N1 GN
4: K1 ← U1:N1 [KXM ]
5: K¯1 ← U1:N1 [K¯XM ]
6: F1 ← U1:N1 [FX2|X1 ]
7: F ′1 ← U1:N1 [F¯X2|X1 ∪ F¯X2|X3 ]
8: Transmit M1 ← [F1, F ′1⊕ K˜1] publicly to all Termi-
nals
9: else if i = k then
10: U1:Nk ← (X2)1:Nk GN
11: Kk ← U1:Nk [KXM ∪ FXM ]
12: F
(1)
k ← U1:Nk [FXM ]
13: F
(2)
k ← U1:Nk [FX2|X1\FXM ]
14: F ′k ← U1:Nk [F¯X2|X1 ∪ F¯X2|X3 ]
15: F¯k ← U1:Nk [FX2|X3\FX2|X1 ]
16: Transmit Mk ← [F (1)k ⊕ K¯k−1, F (2)k , F ′k ⊕ K˜k, F¯k]
publicly to all Terminals
17: else
18: U1:Ni ← (X2)1:Ni GN
19: Ki ← U1:Ni [KXM ∪ FXM ]
20: K¯i ← U1:Ni [K¯XM ]
21: F
(1)
i ← U1:Ni [FXM ]
22: F
(2)
i ← U1:Ni [FX2|X1\FXM ]
23: F ′i ← U1:Ni [F¯X2|X1 ∪ F¯X2|X3 ]
24: Transmit Mi ← [F (1)i ⊕K¯i−1, F (2)i , F ′i⊕K˜i] publicly
to all Terminals
25: end if
26: end for
27: return K1:k ← [K1,K2, . . . ,Kk].
eavesdropper does not have access to the observation of the
source component Z. Assume that all terminals share a seed,
whose rate can be chosen in o(N). The secret-key rate
max
j∈{1,2,3}
min
i∈{1,2,3}\{j}
I(Xj ;Xi)
is achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 7 and
Algorithms 8, 9, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size
N , and whose complexity is O(kN logN).
Proof: See Appendix C.
As a corollary we obtain the following result for a broadcast
model with three terminals.
Corollary 6. Assume the broadcast setting of Section V-A with
m = 3, X1 = X2 = X3 = {0, 1}, and an arbitrary distribution
pXM . Assume that all terminals share a seed, whose rate can
be chosen in o(N). The secret-key key capacity Cs(+∞) =
min(I(X1;X2), I(X2;X3)) is achieved by the polar coding
scheme of Algorithm 7 and Algorithms 8, 9, which involves
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Algorithm 8 Decoding algorithm for Terminal 1 in Model 3
Require: Secret keys {K˜i}i∈J1,kK of size |F¯X2|X1 ∪ F¯X2|X3 |
shared with Terminal 2; for every block i ∈ J1, kK,
the observations (X1)
1:N
i from the source; the set FXM
defined in Algorithm 7.
1: for Block i = 1 to k do
2: if i = 1 then
3: Form [F1, F ′1] from M1 and K˜1 and extract an
estimate of U1:N1 [HX2|X1 ] {See Remark 4 for a
justification}
4: Form Û1:N1 with the successive cancellation decoder
of [26]
5: K̂1 ← Û1:N1 [KXM ]
6: else
7: Estimate [F (1)i , F
(2)
i , F
′
i ] from Mi, Û
1:N
i−1 , and K˜i and
extract an estimate of U1:Ni [HX2|X1 ]
8: Form Û1:Ni with the successive cancellation decoder
of [26]
9: K̂i ← Û1:Ni [KXM ]
10: end if
11: end for
12: return K̂1:k ← [K̂1, K̂2, . . . , K̂k].
Algorithm 9 Decoding algorithm for Terminal 3 in Model 3
Require: Secret keys {K˜i}i∈J1,kK of size |F¯X2|X1 ∪ F¯X2|X3 |
shared with Terminal 2; for every block i ∈ J1, kK, the
observations (X3)
1:N
i from the source; FXM used in
Algorithm 7.
1: for Block i = k to 1 do
2: if i = k then
3: Form [F (2)k , F
′
k, F¯k] from Mk and K˜k and extract
and estimate U1:Nk [HX2|X3 ] {See Remark 5 for a
justification}
4: Form Û1:Nk with the successive cancellation decoder
of [26]
5: K̂1 ← Û1:N1 [KXM ]
6: else
7: Estimate [K¯i, F
(2)
i , F
′
i ] from Mi, Û
1:N
i+1 , and K˜i and
extract an estimate of U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ]
8: Form Û1:Ni with the successive cancellation decoder
of [26]
9: K̂i ← Û1:Ni [KXM ]
10: end if
11: end for
12: return K̂1:k ← [K̂1, K̂2, . . . , K̂k].
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Fig. 6. Example of Markov tree model with uniform marginal for m = 15.
Each vertex represent the random variable observed by a given terminal, and
each edge can be seen as a binary symmetric test channel. We have noted
(n0, n1) , argmin(i,j)∈E(T )I(Xi;Xj), N 1(n0) , {n1, n1,1, n1,2},
N 2(n0) , {n2,i}i∈J1,5K, N 3(n0) , {n3,i}i∈J1,6K
a chaining of k blocks of size N , and whose complexity is
O(kN logN).
VI. MODEL 4: MULTITERMINAL MARKOV TREE MODEL
WITH UNIFORM MARGINALS
A. Secret-key generation model
The model for which we now develop a polar coding scheme
was first introduced in [39, Model 3]. We assume that all the
observation alphabets are Xi = {0, 1} for i ∈ M. As illus-
trated in Fig. 6, consider a tree T with vertex set V(T ) ,M
and edge set E(T ). The joint probability distribution pXM is
characterized as follows. ∀(i, j) ∈ E(T ),∀xi, xj ∈ {0, 1},
pXiXj (xi, xj)
, 1
2
(1− pi,j)1{xi = xj}+ 1
2
pi,j(1− 1{xi = xj}),
which means that pXi = pXj is uniform and the test channel
between Xi and Xj is a binary symmetric channel with
parameter pi,j .
Furthermore, we suppose that the eavesdropper does not
have access to the observation of the source component Z.
This setup is called the Markov tree model with uniform
marginals. The expression of the secret-key capacity is recalled
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 ( [4]). Consider the Markov tree model with
uniform marginal. The secret-key capacity CSK(+∞) is given
by
CSK(+∞) = I(Xn0 ;Xn1),
where (n0, n1) , argmin(i,j)∈E(T )I(Xi;Xj).
B. Polar coding scheme
We first introduce some notation for the coding scheme.
For any i ∈ M, we note N j(i) the set of vertices in V(T )
that are at distance j from vertex i. We note (n0, n1) ,
argmin(i,j)∈E(T )I(Xi;Xj). We also consider for the encoding
process the tree T as a rooted tree with root Xn0 . An example
is depicted in Figure 6.
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Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. For j ∈ M, we set U1:Nj ,
X1:Nj GN . For j1 ∈ M, j2 ∈ M\{j1}, and δN , 2−N
β
,
β ∈]0, 1/2[, we define the sets
HXj1 |Xj2 ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U ij1 |U1:i−1j1 X1:Nj2 ) > δN} .
The exact encoding and decoding algorithms are given in
Algorithm 10 and Algorithm 11. The principle of their op-
eration is to have all terminal reconstruct U1:Nn0 and choose
the key as a subvector of U1:Nn0 . The idea behind the inter-
terminal communication, which is illustrated in Figure 7, is
to take advantage of the tree structure to make all Terminals
reconstruct X1:Nn0 ; the source uniformity plays a crucial role
to develop a universal result in Lemma 14, similar to the one
obtained for the broadcast model in Lemma 13. Although the
assumption of uniform marginal is required in our proof, a side
benefit is that no pre-shared seed is needed to ensure strong
secrecy.
Algorithm 10 Encoding algorithm for Model 4
1: Fn0 ← U1:Nn0
[
HXn0 |Xn1
]
.
2: Terminal n0 transmits Fn0 publicly.
3: Define d as the maximal distance between the vertex n0
and the vertices in V(T ).
4: for i = 1 to d− 1 do
5: for j ∈ N i(n0) do
6: if N 1(j) ∩N i+1(n0) 6= ∅ then
7: Define j∗ , arg max
j˜∈N 1(j)∩N i+1(n0)
pj˜,j .
8: Fi,j ← U1:Nj
[
HXj |Xj∗
]
,
9: Terminal j transmits Fi,j publicly
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: return K ← U1:Nn0
[
HcXn0 |Xn1
]
Algorithm 11 Decoding algorithm for Model 4
Require: Observations from the source, and public messages
F.
1: With Fn0 = U
1:N
n0
[
HXn0 |Xn1
]
, the terminals in N 1(n0)
estimate X1:Nn0 with the successive cancellation decoder
of [26], and then form K̂ an estimate of K.
2: Let k ∈ J1, d−1K, j ∈ N k+1(n0) and define the singleton
{ik} , N k(n0)∩N 1(j). With Fk,ik Terminal j estimates
X1:Nik (at distance k from the root) with the successive
cancellation decoder of [26].
By repeating this process, Terminal j is successively able
to form the estimate of sources closer to the root, X1:Nik−1 ,
X1:Nik−2 , . . . , X
1:N
i1
, for some i1 ∈ N 1(n0), i2 ∈ N 2(n0),
. . . , ik−1 ∈ N k−1(n0). Finally, from its estimate of X1:Ni1 ,
Terminal j estimates X1:Nn0 and forms K̂ an estimate of
K.
3: return K̂
We note F the set of indices (i, j) for which Fi,j is defined.
We note the collective inter-terminals communication as F ,
{Fi,j}(i,j)∈F .
The analysis of the scheme in Section VI-C leads to the
following result.
Theorem 7. Consider the Markov tree model with uniform
marginals. The secret-key capacity CSK(+∞) given in Propo-
sition 5 is achievable with perfect secrecy with the polar cod-
ing scheme of Section VI-B, whose computational complexity
is O(N logN). No pre-shared seed is required.
Proof: See Section VI-C.
C. Analysis of polar coding scheme: Proof of Theorem 7
1) Key Rate: From [26], we obtain the key rate
lim
N→∞
|HcXn0 |Xn1 |
N
= 1− lim
N→∞
|HXn0 |Xn1 |
N
= 1−H(Xn0 |Xn1)
= I(Xn0 ;Xn1).
2) Reliability: For k ∈ J1, dK, we define the singleton
{j0} , N 1(j) ∩ N k−1(n0), and we show that Terminal
j ∈ N k(n0) can reconstruct Xj0 from Fk−1,j0 . Specifically,
we establish the following.
Lemma 14. Let k ∈ J1, dK, j ∈ N k(n0), and define
the singleton {j0} , N 1(j) ∩ N k−1(n0). Define Dk,j0 ,
N 1(j0) ∩N k(n0), and i∗ , arg max
i˜∈Dk,j0
pi˜,j0 . We have
∀i ∈ Dk,j0 , HXj0 |Xi ⊂ HXj0 |Xi∗ .
Proof: For i ∈ D, define X¯i , Xj0 + Bi, with
Bi ∼ B(pi,j0). By Lemma 13, we now that for any i ∈ D,
HXj0 |X¯i ⊂ HXj0 |X¯i∗ . Then, observe that for any i ∈ D, for
any x, y ∈ {0, 1},
pX¯iXj0 (x, y)
= pXj0 (y)pX¯i|Xj0 (x|y)
=
1
2
(1{x = y}(1− pi,j0) + pi,j0(1− 1{x = y}))
= pXiXj0 (x, y),
Hence, HXj0 |Xi = HXj0 |X¯i ⊂ HXj0 |X¯i∗ = HXj0 |Xi∗
Lemma 14 is similar to Lemma 13; however, unlike
Lemma 13, the proof of Lemma 14 requires uniform
marginals.
Now, observe that with Fn0 = U
1:N
n0
[
HXn0 |Xn1
]
, all
terminals in N 1(n0) can reconstruct X1:Nn0 with error prob-
ability O(NδN ) by Lemma 14 and [26]. We then show by
induction that all terminals can reconstruct X1:Nn0 with error
probability O(NδN ). Assume that for k ∈ J1, d − 1K, X1:Nn0
can be reconstructed with error probability O(NδN ) from any
X1:Nj , where j ∈ N k(n0). Let j ∈ N k+1(n0) and define
the singleton {i} = N k(n0) ∩ N 1(j). With Fk,i Terminal
j can reconstruct X1:Ni with error probability O(NδN ) by
Lemma 14 and [26]. Then, since X1:Ni ∈ N k(n0), Terminal
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Xn1 Xn1,1Xn1,2
Xn2,1 Xn2,2Xn2,3 Xn2,4Xn2,5
Xn3,1Xn3,2 Xn3,3Xn3,4Xn3,5Xn3,6
Fig. 7. Example for the reconstruction process. A dashed-line from Terminal
i to Terminal j represents a public transmission from Terminal i of the
information necessary for Terminal j to reconstruct Xi. A dotted-line from
Terminal i to Terminal j represents a “virtual communication” and means
that Terminal j is able to reconstruct Xi from the information corresponding
to the dashed-line leaving Terminal i – this illustrates Lemma 14. For
this example we have assumed I(Xn1,2 ;Xn2,1 ) 6 I(Xn1,2 ;Xn2,3 ),
I(Xn1 ;Xn2,5 ) 6 min{I(Xn1 ;Xn2,i )}i∈{2,4}, I(Xn2,1 ;Xn3,6 ) 6
I(Xn2,1 ;Xn3,5 ), I(Xn2,2 ;Xn3,4 ) 6 min{I(Xn2,2 ;Xn3,i )}i∈{2,3}. All
in all, all the terminals can reconstruct Xn0
j can also reconstruct X1:Nn0 with error probability O(NδN )
by induction hypothesis.
We conclude that all terminals can reconstruct X1:Nn0 and
therefore K = U1:Nn0
[
HcXn0 |Xn1
]
with error probability
Pe(SN ) = O(NδN ). The global reconstruction process is
illustrated in Figure 7.
3) Key Uniformity: By definition of the model, Xn0 is
uniform, hence, U1:Nn0 and K , U1:Nn0
[
HcXn0 |n1
]
are also
uniform.
4) Perfect Secrecy: We first introduce an equivalent model
as follows. We start by defining for i ∈ N 1(n0), X¯i , Xn0 +
Bi, with Bi ∼ B(pi,n0). Then, for k ∈ J2, dK, for i ∈ N k(n0),
define the singleton {i0} , N k−1(n0) ∩ N 1(i), and X¯i ,
X¯i0 +Bi, with Bi ∼ B(pi,i0). Consequently, similarly to the
proof of Lemma 14, we have
pX¯M = pXM . (17)
Moreover, for j ∈M\{n0}. We have
U¯1:Nj = U
1:N
n0
⊕
i∈Pn0,j
B˜1:Ni ,
where Pn0,j denotes the set of vertices that form a path
between Xn0 and Xj including j and excluding n0, B˜
N
i ,
BNi GN , and U¯
1:N
j , X¯1:Nj GN , i ∈M\{n0}. Recall that for
(i, j) ∈ F ,
Fi,j = U
1:N
j
[
HXj |Xj∗
]
.
We define
F¯i,j , U¯1:Nj
[
HXj |Xj∗
]
= U1:Nn0
[
HXj |Xj∗
] ⊕
i∈Pn0,j
B˜1:Ni
[
HXj |Xj∗
]
, (18)
and
F¯ , {F¯i,j}(i,j)∈F . (19)
Lemma 15. Let j ∈ M\{n0}. There exists a unique i ∈J1, d − 1K such that j ∈ N i(n0). As in Algorithm 10, define
j∗ , arg max
j˜∈N 1(j)∩N i+1(n0)
pj˜,j . We have HXj |Xj∗ ⊂ HXn0 |Xn1 .
Proof: Let j ∈ M\{n0}. Let rj be such that pn0,n1 =
pj,j∗ ? rj (such rj exists by definition of (n0, n1)), where
? is defined as in Example 1. We define ∆(1)j ∼ B(pj,j∗)
and ∆(2)j ∼ B(rj) such that Bn1 = ∆(1)j + ∆(2)j . We
define the dummy random variables X¯j∗ , Xn0 + ∆
(1)
j and
X¯n1 , Xn0 + ∆
(1)
j + ∆
(1)
j . Then, for any x, y ∈ {0, 1}, and
by uniformity of the marginals of pXM ,
pX¯j∗Xn0
(x, y)
= pXn0 (y)pX¯j∗ |Xn0 (x|y)
=
1
2
pX¯j∗ |Xn0 (x|y)
=
1
2
[(1− 1{x = y})pj,j∗ + (1− pj,j∗)1{x = y}]
=
1
2
pXj∗ |Xj (x|y)
= pXj∗Xj (x, y),
so that HXj |Xj∗ = HXn0 |X¯j∗ . Similarly, we have pXn1Xn0 =
pX¯n1Xn0
so that HXn0 |Xn1 = HXn0 |X¯n1 . Hence, by the data
processing inequality, we obtain HXj |Xj∗ = HXn0 |X¯j∗ ⊂HXn0 |X¯n1 = HXn0 |Xn1 .
We can now show that perfect secrecy holds as follows.
L(SN )
= I(K;F)
= I
(
U1:Nn0
[
HcXn0 |Xn1
]
;F
)
(a)
= I
(
U¯1:Nn0
[
HcXn0 |Xn1
]
; F¯
)
(b)
6 I
(
U¯1:Nn0
[
HcXn0 |Xn1
]
; U¯1:Nn0
[
HXn0 |Xn1
]
, B˜1:NJ1,mK\{n0}
[
HXn0 |Xn1
])
= I
(
U¯1:Nn0
[
HcXn0 |Xn1
]
; U¯1:Nn0
[
HXn0 |Xn1
])
+ I
(
U¯1:Nn0
[
HcXn0 |Xn1
]
; B˜1:NJ1,mK\{n0}
[
HXn0 |Xn1
]∣∣∣ U¯1:Nn0 [HXn0 |Xn1 ])
(c)
= I
(
U¯1:Nn0
[
HcXn0 |Xn1
]
; B˜1:NJ1,mK\{n0}
[
HXn0 |Xn1
]∣∣∣ U¯1:Nn0 [HXn0 |Xn1 ])
6 I
(
U¯1:Nn0 ; B˜
1:NJ1,mK\{n0}
[
HXn0 |Xn1
])
(d)
= 0,
where (a) follows by (17), (18), and (19), (b) follows from
Lemma 15 and Equation (18), (c) follows by uniformity of
U¯1:Nn0 , (d) holds by independence of U¯
1:N
n0 and B˜
1:NJ1,mK\{n0}.
We have thus shown perfect secrecy.
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Fig. 8. Model for biometric secret generation
VII. APPLICATION TO SECRECY AND PRIVACY FOR
BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS
In this final section, we show how the results obtained for
Model 2 may be applied to the related problems of secrecy
and privacy for biometric systems [45]–[48]. As noted in [46],
the main difficulty in constructing practical codes for such
problems is the need for vector quantization; we show here
that polar codes offer a low-complexity solution and provably
optimal solutions for the models studied in [46].
A. Biometric system models
Consider two biometric sequences X1:N and Y 1:N dis-
tributed according to the memoryless source (XY, pXY ).
Assume that X1:N is an enrollment sequence and Y 1:N an
authentication sequence observed by an encoder and a decoder,
respectively. In [46], four different models are considered.
We only deal with the “generated-secret systems” and the
“generated-secret systems with zero leakage,” as codes for the
latter models can be used for the “chosen-secret systems” and
the “chosen-secret systems with zero leakage” using a masking
technique [46].
1) Generated-secret systems: A biometric secret generation
strategy SbioN is illustrated in Fig. 8 and is formally defined as
follows.
Definition 3. Let R ∈ R+. Let S be an alphabet of size
2NR. The protocol defined by the following steps is called a
(2NR, N,R) biometric secret generation strategy.
• The encoder observes the enrollment sequence X1:N ;
• The encoder generates a secret S ∈ S from X1:N ;
• The encoder transmits publicly to the decoder helper data
M ;
• The decoder observes the authentication sequence Y 1:N ,
and computes Ŝ ∈ S.
The performance of a biometric secret generation strategy
is measured in terms of
• the average probability of error between the biometric
secrets with Pe(SbioN ) , P[S 6= Ŝ],
• the information leakage of M on S with L(SbioN ) ,
I(M ;S),
• the privacy leakage of M on X1:N with Pc(SbioN ) ,
I(M ;X1:N |S) (conditional case), or Pu(SbioN ) ,
I(M ;X1:N ) (unconditional case),
• the uniformity of the biometric secret U(SbioN ) ,
logd2NRe −H(S).
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Fig. 9. Model for biometric secret generation with zero leakage
Definition 4. For a fixed privacy leakage threshold L, a
biometric secret rate R and information is achievable if
there exists a sequence of (2NR, N,R) secret-key generation
strategies
{SbioN }N>1 such that
lim
N→∞
Pe(SbioN ) =0, (reliability)
lim
N→∞
L(SbioN ) =0, (strong secrecy)
lim
N→∞
Pc(SbioN )/N 6L, (privacy leakage)
lim
N→∞
U(SbioN ) =0. (uniformity)
Moreover, the supremum of achievable rates is called the
biometric secret capacity and is denoted CcBio(L). For the
unconditional case, Pc(SbioN ) is replaced with Pu(SbioN ), and
the biometric secret capacity and is denoted by CuBio(L).
Note that we require a stronger security metric than in [46].
The biometric secret capacities are known and recalled below.
Theorem 8 ([46]). Let (XY, pXY ) be a BMS and L ∈ R+ be a
privacy leakage threshold. The conditional and unconditional
biometric secret capacities are equal CcBio(L) = C
u
Bio(L),
moreover,
CcBio(L) = max
U
I(Y ;U)
subject to L = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
U → X → Y,
|U|6 |X |.
Remark 6. The equality L = I(U ;X) − I(U ;Y ) and the
range constraint |U|6 |X | are obtained from [11].
2) Generated-secret systems with zero leakage: A bio-
metric secret generation strategy with zero leakage SbioZN is
describes in Figure 9 and is formally defined as follows.
Definition 5. Let R ∈ R+. Let S be an alphabet of size
2NR. Assume that the encoder and decoder share a uniformly
distributed secret-key P beforehand. The protocol defined by
the following steps is called a (2NR, N,R) biometric secret
generation strategy with zero leakage.
• The encoder observes the enrollment sequence X1:N ;
• The encoder generates a secret S ∈ S from X1:N and P ;
• The encoder transmits publicly to the decoder helper data
M which is a function of X1:N and P ;
• The decoder observes the authentication sequence Y 1:N ,
and computes Ŝ ∈ S from Y 1:N and P .
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The performance of a biometric secret generation strategy
with zero leakage is measured in terms of
• the average probability of error between the biometric
secrets with Pe(SbioN ) , P[S 6= Ŝ],
• the information leakage of M on S and X1:N
with Lc(SbioN ) , I(SX1:N ;M) (conditional case), or
Lu(SbioN ) , I(S;M)+ I(X1:N ;M) (unconditional case),
• the length of the secret-key P with H(SbioZN ) ,
|P |−H(P ) ,
• the uniformity of the biometric secret U(SbioN ) ,
logd2NRe −H(S).
Definition 6. For a fixed secret-key length K, a biometric
secret rate R is achievable with zero leakage if there exists a
sequence of (2NR, N,R) biometric secret generation strate-
gies with zero leakage
{SbioZN }N>1 such that
lim
N→∞
Pe(SbioZN ) =0, (reliability)
lim
N→∞
Lc(SbioZN ) =0, (strong secrecy)
lim
N→∞
H(SbioZN )/N 6K, (secret-key length)
lim
N→∞
U(SbioZN ) =0. (uniformity)
Moreover, the supremum of achievable rates is called the zero-
leakage biometric secret capacity and is denoted CcBioZ(L). For
the unconditional case Pc(SbioZN ) is replaced with Pu(SbioZN ),
and the zero-leakage biometric secret capacity and is denoted
CuBioZ(L).
Note that we require a stronger security metric than in [46].
The zero-leakage biometric secret capacities are known and
recalled below.
Theorem 9 ([46]). Let (XY, pXY ) be a BMS and K ∈ R+ be
a fixed length. The conditional and unconditional zero-leakage
biometric secret capacities are equal CcBioZ(K) = C
u
BioZ(K)),
moreover,
CcBioZ(L) = max
U
I(Y ;U) +K
subject to K = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
U → X → Y,
|U|6 |X |.
Remark 7. The equality K = I(U ;X) − I(U ;Y ) and the
range constraint |U|6 |X | are obtained from [11].
B. Polar coding scheme for generated-secret systems
Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. Fix a joint probability distribution
pXU . We note V 1:N , U1:NGN . For δN , 2−N
β
, where
β ∈]0, 1/2[, define the following sets
HU ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (V i|V 1:i−1) > δN} ,
VU ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (V i|V 1:i−1) > 1− δN} ,
VU |X ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (V i|V 1:i−1X1:N) > 1− δN} ,
HU |Y ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (V i|V 1:i−1Y 1:N) > δN} ,
HU |X ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (V i|V 1:i−1X1:N) > δN} .
The scheme proposed is a special case (it corresponds to the
case Z = ∅) of the scheme in Section IV-B. However, for
completeness and clarity, we provide its detailed description
in Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13 with the notation of the
biometric secret generation problem.
Algorithm 12 Encoding algorithm for generated secret sys-
tems
Require: S˜0, a secret key of size |(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |; AUXY
be any subset of VU\HU |Y with size |(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |;
Observations X1:Ni in every block i ∈ J1, kK; a vector R1
of uniformly distributed bits with size |VU |X |.
1: Transmit R1 publicly.
2: for Block i = 1 to k do
3: V˜ 1:Ni [VU |X ]← R1
4: Given X1:Ni , successively draw the remaining
bits of V˜ 1:Ni according to p˜V 1:Ni X1:Ni ,∏N
j=1 p˜V ji |V j−1i X1:N pX1:N with
p˜V ji |V 1:j−1i X1:N (v
j |V˜ 1:j−1i X1:Ni )
,
{
pV j |V 1:j−1X1:N (vj |V˜ 1:j−1i X1:Ni ) if i ∈ HU\VU |X
pV j |V 1:j−1(vj |V˜ 1:j−1i ) if i ∈ HcU
(20)
5: S˜i ← V˜ 1:Ni [AUXY ]
6: Si ← V˜ 1:Ni [(VU\HU |Y )\AUXY ]
7: Fi ← V˜ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X) ∩ VU ]
8: F ′i ← V˜ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU ]
9: Transmit Mi ← [Fi, F ′i ⊕ S˜i−1] publicly
10: end for
11: return S1:k ← [S1, S2, . . . , Sk]
Algorithm 13 Decoding algorithm for generated secret sys-
tems
Require: The secret-key S˜0, and the set AUXY defined in
Algorithm 12; Observations Y 1:Ni and message Mi trans-
mitted by other party in every block i ∈ J1, kK, vector R1.
1: for Block i = 1 to k do
2: Form V˜ 1:Ni [HU |Y ] from (Fi, F ′i ) = V˜ 1:Ni [HU |Y \VU |X ]
and R1 = Ri = V˜ 1:Ni [VU |X ].
3: Create estimate V̂ 1:Ni of V˜
1:N
i with the successive
cancellation decoder of [26]
4: Ŝi ← V̂ 1:Ni [(VU\HU |Y )\AUXY ]
5: S˜i ← V̂ 1:Ni [AUXY ]
6: end for.
7: return Ŝ1:k , [Ŝ1, Ŝ2, . . . , Ŝk].
Remark 8. One may actually use S1:Nk [VU\HU |Y ] as the Sk
and slightly increase the biometric secret rate in Algorithm 12.
However, one does not distinguish the last block from the
others for convenience – see Remark 1.
Based on the results established for Model 2 in Section IV,
we obtain the following.
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Theorem 10. Consider a BMS (XY, pXY ). Assume that the
encoder and the decoder share a secret seed. For any L ∈
R, the biometric secret capacities CcBio(L), and CuBio(L), are
achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 12 and
Algorithms 13, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size
N , and whose complexity is O(kN logN). Moreover, the seed
rate is in o
(
2−N
α)
, α < 1/2.
Theorem 10 is a direct consequence of Theorem 4 for the
particular case Z = ∅, since
1
kN
max(Pc(SbioN ),Pu(SbioN ))
6 1
kN
H(M1:k)
6 1
kN
k∑
i=1
H(Mi)
6 1
kN
k∑
i=1
log|Mi|
=
1
N
|HU |Y \VU |X |
=
1
N
|HU |Y |− 1
N
|VU |X |
N→∞−−−−→ I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
where we have used U → X → Y , [26], and Lemma 1.
Note also that for i ∈ J0, k − 1K, S˜i = o(N).
C. Polar coding scheme for generated-secret systems with zero
leakage
The encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algo-
rithm 14 and Algorithm 15. The difference with the scheme
of Section VII-B is that the public communication is protected
with a secret-key shared by the encoder and the decoder.
Algorithm 14 Encoding algorithm for generated secret sys-
tems with zero leakage
Require: k secret keys {Pi}i∈J1,kK of size |HU |Y \VU |X |;
observations X1:Ni in every block i ∈ J1, kK; a vector
R1 of uniformly distributed bits with size |VU |X |.
1: Transmit R1 publicly.
2: for Block i = 1 to k do
3: V˜ 1:Ni [VU |X ]← R1
4: Given observations X1:Ni , successively draw the re-
maining bits of V˜ 1:Ni according to p˜ViXi defined
by (20).
5: Fi ← V˜ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X) ∩ VU ]
6: F ′i ← V˜ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU ]
7: Si ← [V˜ 1:Ni [VU\HU |Y ], Fi]
8: Transmit Mi ← [Fi, F ′i ]⊕ Pi publicly
9: end for
10: return S1:k ← [S1, S2, . . . , Sk]
The performance of the algorithms is ensured by the fol-
lowing result.
Algorithm 15 Decoding algorithm for generated secret sys-
tems with zero leakage
Require: The secret key Pi, the message Mi transmitted by
other party, observations Y 1:Ni in every block i ∈ J1, kK,
and vector R1.
1: for Block i = 1 to k do
2: Form V˜ 1:Ni [HU |Y ] from (Fi, F ′i ) = V˜ 1:Ni [HU |Y \VU |X ]
and R1 = V˜ 1:Ni [VU |X ].
3: Create estimate V̂ 1:Ni of V˜
1:N
i with the successive
cancellation decoder of [26]
4: Ŝi ← [V̂ 1:Ni [VU\HU |Y ], Fi]
5: end for.
6: return Ŝ1:k , [Ŝ1, Ŝ2, . . . , Ŝk].
Theorem 11. Consider a BMS (XY, pXY ). For any P ∈ R,
the zero-leakage biometric secret capacities CcBioZ(K), and
CuBioZ(K), are achieved by the polar coding scheme of Al-
gorithm 14 and Algorithms 15, which involves a chaining of
k blocks of size N , and whose complexity is O(kN logN).
Remark that one only needs to prove that CcBioZ(K) is
achieved in Theorem 11, since a code that achieves CcBioZ(K)
also achieves CuBioZ(K) by [46]. The proof of Theorem 11 for
CcBioZ(K) is similar to the proof of Theorem 4 and is thus
omitted. To show that Si = [V˜ 1:Ni [VU\HU |Y ], Fi], i ∈ J1, kK,
is uniform one can use Lemma 7, then, similarly to Theorem 4,
one can show that S1:k is also uniform and that strong secrecy
holds. Note also that for i ∈ J0, k − 1K, F ′i = o(N).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed low-complexity secret-key capacity-
achieving schemes based on polar coding for several classes
of sources. Our schemes jointly handle secrecy and reliability,
which contrasts with sequential methods that successively
perform reconciliation and privacy amplification. Although
sequential methods apply to more general classes of sources,
our polar coding schemes may be easier to design and may
operate with lesser complexity. Nevertheless, the price to be
paid for low complexity is that our schemes often require
a pre-shared seed, whose rate is negligible compared to
the blocklength. When the eavesdropper has no access to
correlated observations of the source, and when the source has
uniform marginals, we have identified several configurations,
including multiterminal models, for which no pre-shared seed
is required. Finally, we have applied our polar coding schemes
to privacy and secrecy for some biometric systems.
Our polar coding schemes are particularly convenient to
handle rate-limited public communication and vector quanti-
zation, which are often the major hurdle in designing optimal
secret-key generation schemes.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR MODEL 1 IN SECTION III
A. Proof of Corollary 2
We perform the same encoding as in Algorithm 1 for
Block 1 with AXY Z = ∅. Define the set
HX|Z ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1Z1:N) > δN} .
We have
|F ′1| = |HX|Y \VX|Z |
(a)
6 |HX|Z\VX|Z |
(b)
= |HX|Z | − |VX|Z |,
where (a) holds because HX|Y ⊂ HX|Z since we have
assumed X → Y → Z, (b) holds because VX|Z ⊂ HX|Z .
We conclude by Lemma 1 and [26] that |F ′1|= o(N).
B. Proof of Proposition 1
1) Polar Coding Scheme: Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. We set
U1:N , X1:NGN . We define for δN , 2−N
β
, β ∈]0, 1/2[,
the following set
VX|Z ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1Z1:N) > 1− δN} .
Alice and Bob define the key as K , U1:N [VX|Z ].
2) Scheme analysis: By Lemma 1, we have a key rate that
satisfies
lim
N→+∞
|VX|Z |/N = H(X|Z).
Moreover, we also have secrecy and key uniformity
L(SN ) +U(SN ) = I
(
K;Z1:N
)
+ |K|−H(K)
= |K|−H (K|Z1:N)
= |VX|Z |−H
(
U1:N [VX|Z ]|Z1:N
)
(a)
6 |VX|Z |−
∑
i∈VX|Z
H(U i|U1:i−1Z1:N )
(b)
6 |VX|Z |δN
6 NδN ,
where (a) holds because conditioning reduces entropy, (b)
holds by definition of VX|Z .
Finally, since X = Y , we have Pe(SN ) = 0.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
1) Polar Coding Scheme: Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. We set
U1:N , X1:NGN . We define for δN , 2−N
β
, β ∈]0, 1/2[,
the following sets
HX|Y ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1Y 1:N) > δN} ,
HX ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1) > δN} .
We define a secret-key generation strategy SN as follows.
Define the key as K , U1:N [HX\HX|Y ], and the public
message as F , U1:N [HX|Y ].
2) Scheme analysis: Observe that HX|Y ⊂ HX , because
conditioning reduces entropy. We thus have by [26], a key rate
equal to
lim
N→+∞
|HX\HX|Y |
N
= lim
N→+∞
|HX |−|HX|Y |
N
= H(X)−H(X|Y )
= I(X;Y ).
Note that the key K is uniform because X1:N is uniform,
that is
Ue(SN ) = 0.
Then, by [26, Theorem 3], Bob can reconstruct K from F
with an error probability satisfying
Pe(SN ) 6 NδN .
Finally, by the key uniformity and because (HX\HX|Y ) ∩
HX|Y = ∅ , we have
H(K|F ) = H (U1:N [HX\HX|Y ]|U1:N [HX|Y ])
= H
(
U1:N [HX\HX|Y ]
)
= H(K),
which means that we obtain perfect secrecy, that is
L(SN ) = I(K;F ) = H(K)−H(K|F ) = 0.
D. Proof of Lemma 1
As in [26], for a pair of random variables (X,Y ) distributed
according to pXY over X × Y , we define the Bhattacharyya
parameter as
Z(X|Y ) = 2
∑
y
pY (y)
√
pX|Y (0|y)pX|Y (1|y).
We will need the following counterpart of [26, Proposition 1]
that is proved using the same technique as [41, Lemma 20].
Lemma 16. If (X1, Y1) and (X2, Y2) are two independent
drawings of (X,Y ), then
Z
(
X1 ⊕X2|Y 21
)
>
√
2Z(X|Y )2 − Z(X|Y )4.
Proof: We have for any v1, v2 ∈ X , y1, y2 ∈ Y ,
pX1⊕X2,X2,Y1,Y2(v1, v2, y1, y2)
= pXY (v1 + v2, y1)pXY (v2, y2).
Hence,
Z
(
X1 ⊕X2|Y 21
)
= 2
∑
y1,y2
(∑
v2
pXY (v2, y1) pXY (v2, y2)
·
∑
v′2
pXY (1 + v
′
2, y1) pXY (v
′
2, y2)
1/2 ,
21
which can be rewritten as
Z
(
X1 ⊕X2|Y 21
)
=
1
2
Z (X1|Y1)Z (X2|Y2)
×
∑
y1,y2
P1 (y1)P2 (y2)
√
A (y1)
2
+A (y2)
2 − 4,
where, for i ∈ J1, 2K,
Pi (yi) ,
2
√
pXY (0, yi) pXY (1, yi)
Z (Xi|Yi)
and
A (yi) ,
√
pXY (0, yi)
pXY (1, yi)
+
√
pXY (1, yi)
pXY (0, yi)
.
As observed in [41, Lemma 20], for i ∈ J1, 2K, A (yi)2 > 4,
by the arithmetic-geometric inequality, and x 7→ √x2 + a is
convex for a > 0. Hence, since for i ∈ J1, 2K, Pi defines a
probability distribution over Y , by Jensen’s inequality applied
twice
Z
(
X1 ⊕X2|Y 21
)
> 1
2
Z (X1|Y1)Z (X2|Y2)
×
√
(EP1 [A (y1)])
2
+ (EP2 [A (y2)])
2 − 4.
We conclude by substituting EPi [A (yi)] = 2Z(Xi|Yi) , for i ∈J1, 2K.
Let α ∈]β, 1/2[. Define the sets
FX|Z ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : Z (U i|U1:i−1Z1:N) > 1− 2−Nα} ,
HX|Z ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H (U i|U1:i−1Z1:N) > δN} .
Similar to [41, Theorem 19], which relies on the result in [49],
we can show with Lemma 16
lim
N→+∞
|FX|Z |/N = H(X|Z).
But, by [26, Proposition 2], for N large enough, |FX|Z |6
|VX|Z |, hence, limN→+∞|VX|Z |/N > H(X|Z). Since we
also have limN→+∞|HX|Z |/N = H(X|Z), by [26], and
VX|Z ⊂ HX|Z , we conclude
lim
N→+∞
|VX|Z |/N = H(X|Z).
E. Proof of Lemma 4
Let i ∈ J1, kK, we note qU
K,K˜
the uniform distribution overJ1, 2|Ki|+|K˜i|K. We have,
V
(
pKiK˜i , pKipK˜i
)
(a)
6 V
(
pKiK˜i , qUK,K˜
)
+ V
(
qU
K,K˜
, qUKpK˜i
)
+ V
(
qUKpK˜i , pKipK˜i
)
= V
(
pKiK˜i , qUK,K˜
)
+ V
(
qU
K˜
, pK˜i
)
+ V (qUK , pKi)
6 3V
(
pKiK˜i , qUK,K˜
)
(b)
6 3
√
2NδN log 2, (21)
where (a) holds by the triangle inequality, (b) holds by
Pinsker’s inequality and Lemma 2.
Then, for N large enough (|K˜|> 4), we have
I(Ki; K˜i) 6 V(pKiK˜i , pKipK˜i) log2
|K˜|
V(pKiK˜i , pKipK˜i)
6 V(pKiK˜i , pKipK˜i) log2|K˜|
− V(pKiK˜i , pKipK˜i) log2V(pKiK˜i , pKipK˜i)
6 δ∗N ,
where δ∗N , 3
√
2NδN log 2
(
N − log2
(
3
√
2NδN log 2
))
by (21) and because x 7→ x log x is decreasing for x > 0
small enough.
F. Proof of Lemma 5
Let i ∈ J2, kK. By applying the chain rule of mutual
information repeatedly, we obtain
L˜1:ie = αi + βi + γi, (22)
where
αi , I
(
KiK˜i;MiZ
1:N
i
)
,
βi , I
(
K1:i−1;Z1:Ni Mi|KiK˜i
)
,
γi , I
(
K1:iK˜i;Z
1:N
1:i−1M1:i−1|Z1:Ni Mi
)
.
Then, note that
γi 6 I
(
K1:iK˜i−1:iZ1:Ni Mi;Z
1:N
1:i−1M1:i−1
)
= I
(
K1:i−1K˜i−1;Z1:N1:i−1M1:i−1
)
+ I
(
KiK˜iZ
1:N
i Mi;Z
1:N
1:i−1M1:i−1|K1:i−1K˜i−1
)
= L˜1:i−1e , (23)
where the last equality follows from KiK˜iZ1:Ni Mi →
K1:i−1K˜i−1 → Z1:N1:i−1M1:i−1.
We also have,
βi 6 I
(
K1:i−1;Z1:Ni MiK˜i−1|KiK˜i
)
= I
(
K1:i−1; K˜i−1|KiK˜i
)
+ I
(
K1:i−1;Z1:Ni Mi|KiK˜i−1:i
)
(a)
= I
(
K1:i−1; K˜i−1|KiK˜i
)
(b)
6 I
(
K1:i−1; K˜i−1
)
= I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1
)
+ I
(
K1:i−2; K˜i−1|Ki−1
)
6 I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1
)
+ I
(
K1:i−2; K˜i−1Ki−1
)
6 I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1
)
+ I
(
X1:N1:i−2;X
1:N
i−1
)
(c)
= I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1
)
(24)
where (a) holds by K1:i−1 → KiK˜i−1:i → Z1:Ni Mi, (b)
holds by K1:i−1 → K˜i−1 → KiK˜i, (c) holds by independence
between X1:N1:i−2 and X
1:N
i−1 .
Finally, we conclude combining (22), (23), and (24).
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR MODEL 2 IN SECTION IV
A. Proof of Corollary 4
We perform the same encoding as in Algorithm 3 for
Block 1 with AUY Z = ∅. Note that CWSK(Rp) is obtained
when U is uniformly distributed by [11, Prop. 5.3] since X is
uniform and the tests-channel pY |X and pZ|X are symmetric.
Hence, the rate R1 of randomness to perform successive
cancellation encoding can be set equal to zero by [41]. We
also have
|F ′1| = |(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |
(a)
6 |HU |Z\VU |Z |
(b)
= |HU |Z | − |VU |Z |,
where (a) holds because HU |Y ⊂ HU |Z since we have
assumed X → Y → Z, (b) holds because VU |Z ⊂ HU |Z .
We conclude by Lemma 1 and [26] that |F ′1|= o(N).
B. Proof of Lemma 6
Using the notation of [50] for conditional relative entropy,
we have for i ∈ J1, kK, pU1:Ni X1:Ni = pU1:NX1:N and
D(pX1:NU1:N ||p˜X1:Ni U1:Ni )
(a)
= D(pX1:NV 1:N ||p˜X1:Ni V 1:Ni )
(b)
= D(pV 1:N |X1:N ||p˜V 1:Ni |X1:N )
(c)
=
N∑
j=1
D(pV j |V 1:j−1X1:N ||p˜V ji |V 1:j−1i X1:N )
(d)
=
∑
j∈VU|X
∑
j∈HcU
D(pV j |V 1:j−1X1:N ||p˜V ji |V 1:j−1i X1:N )
(e)
=
∑
j∈VU|X
(1−H(V j |V 1:j−1X1:N ))
+
∑
j∈HcU
(H(V j |V 1:j−1)−H(V j |V 1:j−1X1:N ))
6 |VU |X |δN +
∑
j∈HcU
H(V j |V 1:j−1)
6 |VU |X |δN + |HcU |δN
6 NδN ,
where (a) holds by invertibility of Gn, (b) and (c) hold by
the chain rule for divergence, (d) and (e) hold by (7) and by
uniformity of the components of V˜ 1:Ni in VU |X .
C. Proof of Lemma 8
We have by [51, Lemma 2.7]
|Ki|+|K˜i|−H(KiK˜i)
6 V(pKiK˜i , qUK,K˜ ) log2
|Ki|+|K˜i|
V(pKiK˜i , qUK,K˜ )
6 NV(pKiK˜i , qUK,K˜ )
− V(pKiK˜i , qUK,K˜ ) log2V(pKiK˜i , qUK,K˜ )
6 2
√
2 log 2
√
NδN (N − log2(2
√
2 log 2
√
NδN )),
where the last inequality holds for N large enough by
Lemma 7 and because x 7→ x log x is decreasing for x > 0
small enough.
D. Proof of Lemma 9
We only prove the first inequality, the other is obtained
similarly. Let i ∈ J1, kK. We have,
V
(
pKiK˜iR1 , pKipK˜iR1
)
(a)
6 V
(
pKiK˜iR1 , qUK,K˜,R
)
+ V
(
qU
K,K˜,R
, qUKpK˜iR1
)
+ V
(
qUKpK˜iR1 , pKipK˜iR1
)
= V
(
pKiK˜iR1 , qUK,K˜,R
)
+ V
(
qU
K˜,R
, pK˜iR1
)
+ V (qUK , pKi)
6 3V
(
pKiK˜iR1 , qUK,K˜,R
)
(b)
6 6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN , (25)
where (a) holds by the triangle inequality, (b) holds by
Pinsker’s inequality and Lemma 7.
Then, for N large enough (|K|> 4), we have by [52]
I(Ki; K˜iR1)
6 V(pKiK˜iR1 , pKipK˜iR1) log2
|K|
V(pKiK˜iR1 , pKipK˜iR1)
6 NV(pKiK˜iR1 , pKipK˜iR1)
− V(pKiK˜iR1 , pKipK˜iR1) log2V(pKiK˜iR1 , pKipK˜iR1)
6 δ(2)N ,
where δ(2)N , 6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN (N − log2(6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN ))
by (25) and because x 7→ x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small
enough.
E. Proof of Lemma 10
We have for i ∈ J1, kK, pV 1:Ni X1:Ni Z1:Ni = pV 1:NX1:NZ1:N
and
V(p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni , pV 1:N [VU|Z ]Z1:N )
6 V(p˜V 1:Ni X1:Ni Z1:Ni , pV 1:NX1:NZ1:N )
= V(p˜Z1:Ni |V 1:Ni X1:Ni p˜V 1:Ni X1:Ni , pZ1:N |V 1:NX1:N pV 1:NX1:N )
= V(p˜Z1:Ni |X1:Ni p˜V 1:Ni X1:Ni , pZ1:N |X1:N pV 1:NX1:N )
= V(p˜V 1:Ni X1:Ni , pV 1:NX1:N )
6
√
2 log 2
√
NδN , (26)
23
where the last inequality follows by Lemma 6, and
V(pV 1:N [VU|Z ]Z1:N , p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:N )
6 V(pV 1:N [VU|Z ]Z1:N , pV 1:N [VU|Z ]pZ1:N )
+ V(pV 1:N [VU|Z ]pZ1:N , p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:N )
(a)
6 V(pV 1:N [VU|Z ]Z1:N , pV 1:N [VU|Z ]pZ1:N ) +
√
2 log 2
√
NδN
(b)
6
√
2 log 2
√
D(pV 1:N [VU|Z ]Z1:N ||pV 1:N [VU|Z ]pZ1:N )
+
√
2 log 2
√
NδN
=
√
2 log 2
√
I(V 1:N [VU |Z ];Z1:N ) +
√
2 log 2
√
NδN
6
√
2 log 2
√
|VU |Z |−H(V 1:N [VU |Z ]|Z1:N )
+
√
2 log 2
√
NδN
(c)
6 2
√
2 log 2
√
NδN , (27)
where (a) holds by (26), (b) holds by Pinsker’s inequal-
ity, (c) holds because similar to the proof of Lemma 3
|VU |Z |−H(V 1:N [VU |Z ]|Z1:N ) 6 NδN .
Hence, by (26) and (27)
V(p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni , p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:N )
6 V(p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni , pV 1:N [VU|Z ]Z1:N )
+ V(pV 1:N [VU|Z ]Z1:N , p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:N )
6 3
√
2 log 2
√
NδN , (28)
and for N large enough by [52]
I(V˜ 1:Ni [VU |Z ];Z1:Ni )
6 V(p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni , p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:Ni )
× log2
|VU |Z |
V(p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni , p˜V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:Ni )
6 3
√
2 log 2
√
NδN (N − log2(3
√
2 log 2
√
NδN )).
F. Proof of Lemma 12
Let i ∈ J2, kK. By applying the chain rule of mutual
information repeatedly, we obtain
L˜1:ie = αi + βi + γi, (29)
where
αi , I
(
KiK˜i;R1MiZ
1:N
i
)
,
βi , I
(
K1:i−1;R1MiZ1:Ni |KiK˜i
)
,
γi , I
(
K1:iK˜i;M1:i−1Z1:N1:i−1|R1MiZ1:Ni
)
.
Then, note that
γi
(a)
6 I
(
K1:iK˜i−1:iMiZ1:Ni ;M1:i−1Z
1:N
1:i−1|R1
)
= I
(
K1:i−1K˜i−1;M1:i−1Z1:N1:i−1|R1
)
+ I
(
KiK˜iZ
1:N
i Mi;M1:i−1Z
1:N
1:i−1|R1K1:i−1K˜i−1
)
(b)
= I
(
K1:i−1K˜i−1;M1:i−1Z1:N1:i−1|R1
)
(c)
6 I
(
K1:i−1K˜i−1;R1M1:i−1Z1:N1:i−1
)
= L˜1:i−1e , (30)
where (a) and (c) hold by the chain rule and positivity
of mutual information, (b) holds because KiK˜iZ1:Ni Mi →
R1K1:i−1K˜i−1 →M1:i−1Z1:N1:i−1.
We also have,
βk
(d)
6 I
(
K1:i−1;R1MiZ1:Ni K˜i−1|KiK˜i
)
= I
(
K1:i−1; K˜i−1R1|KiK˜i
)
+ I
(
K1:i−1;MiZ1:Ni |KiK˜i−1:iR1
)
(e)
= I
(
K1:i−1; K˜i−1R1|KiK˜i
)
(f)
6 I
(
K1:i−1; K˜i−1R1
)
= I (K1:i−1;R1) + I
(
K1:i−1; K˜i−1|R1
)
= I (K1:i−1;R1) + I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1|R1
)
+ I
(
K1:i−2; K˜i−1|Ki−1R1
)
(g)
= I (K1:i−1;R1) + I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1|R1
)
6 I (K1:i−1;R1) + I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1R1
)
= I (K1:i−2;R1|Ki−1) + I (Ki−1;R1)
+ I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1R1
)
(h)
6 I (K1:i−2;R1) + I (Ki−1;R1) + I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1R1
)
(i)
6
i−1∑
j=1
I (Kj ;R1) + I
(
Ki−1; K˜i−1R1
)
(31)
where (d) holds by the chain rule and positivity of mutual
information, (e) holds because K1:i−1 → KiK˜i−1:iR1 →
MiZ
1:N
i , (f) holds because K1:i−1 → K˜i−1R1 → KiK˜i,
(g) holds because K1:i−2 → Ki−1R1 → K˜i−1, (h) holds
because K1:i−2 → R1 → Ki−1, (i) holds by induction.
Finally, we conclude combining (29), (30), and (31).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
1) Existence of FXM : The set FXM exists because we
have assumed I(X2;X1) 6 I(X2;X3), i.e., H(X2|X1) >
24
H(X2|X3). Indeed,
|FX2|X1\FX2|X3 |−|K¯XM |
= |FX2|X1\FX2|X3 |−|FX2|X3\FX2|X1 |
= |FX2|X1 |−|FX2|X3 |,
and limN→∞(|FX2|X1 |−|FX2|X3 |)/N = H(X2|X1) −
H(X2|X3) by Lemma 1 and [26].
2) Key Rate: The key rate is
|KXM |+(k − 1)|KXM ∪ FXM |
kN
(a)
=
|KXM |+(k − 1)(|KXM |+|FXM |)
kN
=
|KXM |+|FXM |
N
− |FXM |
kN
=
|KXM |+|K¯XM |
N
− |K¯XM |
kN
=
|VX2\HX2|X1 |
N
− |K¯XM |
kN
>
|VX2\HX2|X1 |
N
− |VX2\HX2|X1 |
kN
N→∞−−−−→ I(X1;X2)
(
1− 1
k
)
k→∞−−−→ I(X1;X2),
where (a) holds because FXM ∩ KXM = ∅, and where we
have used Lemma 1 and [26] for the first limit.
3) Reliability: We do not detail the reliability analysis for
Terminal 1, since it is similar to the analysis for Terminal 3.
Let i ∈ J1, k − 1K. Note that Terminal 3 forms an accu-
rate estimate of U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ] only when U1:Ni+1 is correctly
reconstructed (see Remark 5). We note Û1:Ni [HX2|X3 ] the
estimate of U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ] formed by Terminal 3 and define
Ei , {Û1:Ni [HX2|X3 ] 6= U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ]}.
Hence,
P[Ki 6= K̂i]
6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni ]
= P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |Eci ]P[Eci ] + P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |Ei]P[Ei]
6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |Eci ] + P[Ei]
6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |Eci ] + P[U1:Ni+1 6= Û1:Ni+1 ]
(a)
6 NδN + P[U1:Ni+1 6= Û1:Ni+1 ]
(b)
6 (k − i)NδN + P[U1:Nk 6= Û1:Nk ]
(c)
6 (k − i+ 1)NδN ,
where (a) holds because by [26], Terminal 3 can reconstruct
U1:Ni from U
1:N
i [HX2|X3 ] and (X3)1:Ni with error probability
less than NδN , (b) holds by recurrence, (c) holds similarly as
previous equations.
Then, by the union bound,
Pe(SN ) = P[K1:k 6= K̂1:k]
6
k∑
i=1
P[Ki 6= K̂i]
6
k∑
i=1
(k − i+ 1)NδN
=
k(k + 1)
2
NδN .
4) Key Uniformity: Similarly to Lemma 2 we have the key
uniformity for each block.
Lemma 17. Uniformity of [Ki, K¯i] holds for each block,
where i ∈ J1, k − 1K. Specifically,
|Ki|+|K¯i|−H(KiK¯i) 6 NδN .
Hence, we also have
|K¯i|−H(K¯i) 6 NδN ,
|Ki|−H(Ki) 6 NδN .
The global key K1:k is asymptotically uniform as, similarly
to the proof of Theorem 2 in Section III-C5, we have
U(SN ) = |K1:k|−H(K1:k) 6 kNδN .
5) Strong Secrecy: Similar to Lemma 3, we obtain the
following result showing that secrecy holds for each block.
Lemma 18. Let i ∈ J1, kK. For each Block i, secrecy of
[Ki, K¯i] holds. Specifically, we have
I
(
KiK¯iK˜i;Mi
)
6 2NδN .
Proof: We have for i ∈ J2, k − 1K
I(KiK¯iK˜i;F
(2)
i )
(a)
= I(KiK¯i;F
(2)
i )
= H(KiK¯i)−H(KiK¯i|F (2)i )
6 |Ki|+|K¯i|−H(KiK¯iF (2)i ) +H(F (2)i )
6 |Ki|+|K¯i|+|F (2)i |−H(KiK¯iF (2)i )
(b)
= |(VX2\HX2|X1) ∪ (VX2 ∩HX2|X1 ∩ FXM)|
−H(U1:Ni [(VX2\HX2|X1) ∪ (VX2 ∩HX2|X1 ∩ FXM)])
(c)
6 |VX2 |−
∑
j∈VX2
H(U ji |U1:j−1i )
(d)
6 |VX2 |−
∑
j∈VX2
(1− δN )
6 |VX2 |δN
6 NδN , (32)
where (a) holds by independence between K˜i and all the other
random variables, (b) holds by definition of Ki, K¯i, K˜i, and
F
(2)
i , (c) holds because (VX2\HX2|X1) ∪ (VX2 ∩ HX2|X1 ∩
FXM) ⊂ VX2 because conditioning reduces entropy, (d) holds
by definition of VX2 .
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Then, we obtain for i ∈ J2, k − 1K,
I(KiK¯iK˜i;Mi)−NδN
(a)
= I(KiK¯iK˜i;F
(2)
i (F
(1)
i ⊕ K¯i−1)(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1))−NδN
= I(KiK¯iK˜i; (F
(1)
i ⊕ K¯i−1)(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1)|F (2)i )
+ I(KiK¯iK˜i;F
(2)
i )−NδN
(b)
6 I(KiK¯iK˜iF (1)i F
(2)
i F
′
i ; (F
(1)
i ⊕ K¯i−1)(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1))
= H((F
(1)
i ⊕ K¯i−1)(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1))
−H((F (1)i ⊕ K¯i−1)(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1)|KiK¯iK˜iF (1)i F (2)i F ′i )
= H((F
(1)
i ⊕ K¯i−1)(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1))
−H(K¯i−1K˜i−1|KiK¯iK˜iF (1)i F (2)i F ′i )
(c)
= H((F
(1)
i ⊕ K¯i−1)(F ′i ⊕ K˜i−1))−H(K¯i−1K˜i−1)
6 |K¯i−1|+|K˜i−1|−H(K¯i−1)−H(K˜i−1)
(d)
6 NδN ,
where (a) holds by definition of Mi, (b) holds by (32) and the
chain rule for mutual information, (c) holds by independence
between U1:Ni and U
1:N
i−1 , (d) holds by Lemma 17. The cases
i ∈ {1, k} are treated similarly.
Similar to Lemmas 4 and 5 we also have the following
lemmas.
Lemma 19. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have for N large enough
I(Ki; K¯i) 6 δ∗N ,
where
δ∗N , −3N
√
2NδN log 2 log2
(
3
√
2NδN log 2
)
.
Lemma 20. For i ∈ J2, kK, define
L˜1:ie , I(K1:iK¯i;M1:i).
We have
L˜1:ie − L˜1:i−1e 6 I
(
KiK¯i;Mi
)
+ I
(
Ki−1; K¯i−1
)
.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, using Lemmas 18, 20,
19, we obtain
L(SN ) 6 2kNδN + (k − 1)δ∗N .
6) Seed Rate: The seed rate is∑k
i=1|K˜i|
kN
=
k|F¯X2|X1 ∪ F¯X2|X3 |
kN
6
|F¯X2|X1 |+|F¯X2|X3 |
N
N→∞−−−−→ 0,
where we have used Lemma 1 and [26].
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